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1 Synopsis
In modern societies, labour market participation is considered essential for immigrants1 in order
to be regarded as ‘integrated’. Moreover, paid work generally increases societal participation
and reduces welfare dependency. Hence, it is in the interest of both, immigrants and the host-
country society, to ensure a high level of labour-market integration.
Initially, it is important to highlight that ‘labour-market integration’ describes a broad con-
cept with various outcomes. While access to employment per se might be essential, many
(economic) studies investigate post-labour-market entry outcomes, particularly - but not exclu-
sively - immigrant earnings. For instance, Barrett and Duffy (2008) investigate labour market
positions of immigrants as a form of occupational ranking, while Fernandez and Ortega (2008)
investigate native-migrant differences in terms of contract types and job-qualification matches.
Analyses of immigrant earnings, their development over time and relative to native wages, as well
as the economic incentives of (return-)migration, are amongst the most common studies related
to immigrants’ labour market integration (e.g. Baker and Benjamin 1994; Chiquiar and Hanson
2005; Damm 2009; Pan 2012; Dustmann and Go¨rlach 2015 and 2016). Often, studies focus on
so-called ‘earnings differentials’, which are usually estimated on an aggregated level. Grogger
and Hanson (2011), for instance, use OECD emigrant stock data to show that individuals seek
to maximise future earnings when deciding to migrate to a specific country and sort themselves
accordingly based on their educational attainment. Ottaviano and Peri (2012) analyse the long-
run effect of immigration on wages of natives as well as of previous immigrants. Micro-level
approaches, in turn, often analyse the so-called ‘earnings assimilation’, that is, whether immi-
grants are able to close a potential income gap over time, with mixed conclusions (e.g. Borjas
1987 and 1995; Hu 2000; Lubotsky 2007).
The focus on employment outcomes of immigrants, that is, access to paid work, is empha-
sised by scholars who argue that access to employment represents the initial, yet most important
prerequisite for a successful social integration into the host society, including possible subsequent
employment-related advancements (e.g. Rendall et al. 2010; Kalter and Kogan 2014). In fact,
it has been shown that 90% of discrimination against minorities (see Section 1.2.2 below) hap-
pens at these first stages, meaning that immigrants are often even denied the ‘chance to prove’
themselves in the labour market (see Riach and Rich 2002). Consequently, employment (or
unemployment duration) is also a key outcome of the studies we conducted within this project
(see articles #2 and #3).
Especially proponents of experimental investigations focus on the initial phases of the hir-
ing process, such as invitations to job interviews (e.g. Carlsson and Rooth 2007). This is
not only because experimental data is capable of producing robust results, while the usage of
1In this thesis, we apply different definitions of ‘immigrant’, ranging from so-called second generation immi-
grants, i.e. persons with parents originating from outside the host country, to first-generation non-naturalised
immigrants, to very specific groups such as refugees. For simplicity, the general term ‘immigrant’ shall repre-
sent all these groups in this introduction, while ‘native’ represents all individuals not belonging to the group of
immigrants.
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fictitious applications at this stage is feasible and usually ethically acceptable.2 Moreover, gain-
ing a better understanding of the interplay between migration-related aspects and employer
behaviour during the hiring process can provide valuable insights for societal mechanisms in
general. We contribute to this growing literature by studying employers’ hiring behaviour in
quasi-experimental settings to draw inferences about the fundamental drivers of differences in
native-immigrant labour-market outcomes (see article #1).
Independently of the outcomes of interest, the underlying fundamental question always is
‘what aspects ensure successful labour-market integration? ’ The most straightforward, yet accu-
rate answer to this question is a combination of human and social capital or simply skills (e.g.
Checchi 2006; Heckman et al. 2006). In principle, this general relationship between skills and
labour market integration holds independently of origin, that is, migrant status. Persons with
higher or, more precisely, compatible skills are more likely to be in employment and to earn
higher wages. Relevant skills thereby include both, human capital, such as education or on-the-
job training, and social capital, ranging from networks that help finding a job, to appearance,
punctuality, or communication skills. One can also refer to this combination of human- and
social skills as employability.
However, there are numerous accounts of immigrants faring worse in a host-country’s labour
market. Their labour-market participation rates are mostly below the ones of natives, unem-
ployment is usually higher (e.g. Heath and Cheung 2007; McGinnity and Lunn 2011), and
employment-outcomes such as earnings or promotions are worse, too (e.g. Ebner and Helbling
2016). As has been shown, differences in individual employability between natives and immi-
grants - such as lower educational attainment or a lack of social capital - partly explain worse
outcomes (e.g. Aguilera and Massey 2003; Dustmann and Fabbri 2003; Koopmans 2016). Yet,
the picture is far from complete. Moreover, the direction of mechanisms if often unclear: is an
immigrant denied employment in a host-country’s medical sector because she lacks the necessary
skills or because her skills are not recognised? Do immigrants have more difficulties in finding
a job through their network because they lack the social capabilities to ‘integrate’ or because
they are excluded from a closed majority group? To answer these questions, it is important to
understand the very functioning of employment, that is, what role do employers play when it
comes to granting immigrants access to jobs? Are individual skills affected by policies and could
a (perceived) difference in native-immigrant employability be systematically present across a
society?
1.1 The Swiss Context
The particular studies in this thesis seek to draw generalisable answers to these questions based
on Swiss data. While the focus on Switzerland allows to investigate unique policy settings (see
article #3), it also comes with additional advantages. The country has a long-standing tradi-
tion as a pluralistic society in several ways. On the one hand, the state itself consists of four
different language regions (German, French, Italian, and a smaller Romansh enclave), whose
2In a related experiment, we are currently investigating ethnic discrimination on the Swiss housing market
(Auer et al. 2018).
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specific socio-cultural characteristics go beyond differences in communication. These regions
largely follow political borders at the cantonal level, which themselves are equipped with a rel-
atively high level of political independence, including varying approaches towards immigrant
integration and economic performance (e.g. Grin and Sfreddo 1998; Demont-Heinrich 2005;
Federal Office of Statistics 2014; Eugster et al. 2017). As Grin (1998, 3) states: “[...] living in
Switzerland means living entirely in German [. . . ], in French or in Italian.” On the other hand,
the country is host to a large and diverse group of immigrants, particularly but not exclusively
from European countries. Immigration policy in the last decades has been subordinate to the
needs of the economy, initially manifested in the so-called ‘guest-worker approach’ (Piguet 2005;
Ruedin et al. 2015). The government allowed Swiss employers to recruit temporary workers
with requested skills from countries considered culturally similar (Italy, Spain, Greece, Portu-
gal), with the goal to sustain high labour supply while preventing permanent settlement and
growing cultural heterogeneity of the Swiss population at the same time (Becker et al. 2008;
Pineiro and Haller 2012). This guest-worker approach of the 1960s was gradually suspended
amid growing international pressure and replaced with a tiered labour-market model in the
1990s (Mahnig and Piguet 2003). Again, the new system regulated labour market access based
on a notion of cultural proximity or distance from the Swiss majority population. Initially, it
consisted of three ‘circles’: culturally and geographically close EU/EFTA countries, followed by
the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, which were deemed culturally similar
and were expected to provide high-skilled labour, versus all other countries, which occupied the
least preferred third circle (Becker et al. 2008). With the introduction of the free movement
agreement with the European Union in 1998, the three-circle model was replaced by a simplified
two-circle model, distinguishing between immigrants from EU/EFTA countries (the preferred
group) and those from non-EU/EFTA, so-called 3rd-countries (Becker et al. 2008). In general,
this relatively restrictive tiered system reflects the country’s desire to steer immigration based
on social adaptability and conformity to cultural elements of the host society (see Section 1.2.2
below), such as values, religion, and beliefs (see also State Secretary for Migration 2015). At
the same time, with a share of approximately 28% foreign-born among the resident population,
Switzerland has one of the largest immigrant populations in Europe (Eurostat 2016). Hence,
one can conclude that despite its selective approach toward immigration in general, interaction
and co-existence with foreign born has been a constant in the younger history of the country.
From an economic-integration perspective, the Swiss case is particularly interesting. On
the one hand, the critical stance on immigration is reflected in both, the countries policies and
in the public debate, resulting in so-called ethnic penalties, that is, the difference in native-
immigrant labour-market outcomes, which are comparable in their extent to other European
countries (e.g. Midtbøen 2015). On the other hand, Switzerland’s economic performance is
exceptionally strong, resulting in a constantly high demand for labour and even labour shortage
in specific branches (BSS 2014). Hence, immigrants can be expected to face fewer obstacles
caused by human- or social-capital shortcomings than in countries with an abundant supply of
qualified labour. In other words, the Swiss labour market has less freedom of choice, thereby
enhancing immigrants’ chances to succeed and arguably rendering differences in labour-market
outcomes vis-a`-vis natives a conservative estimate of disadvantages in other countries. Related,
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Switzerland also provides an adequate case to study employers’ hiring behaviour, as the topic of
(further) restricting labour immigration currently receives much attention, with a quota system
being regularly discussed. Hence, one can expect employers to unveil their true preferences more
readily because they are afraid of being neglected in the political game.
1.2 Drivers of Immigrants’ Labour-Market Disadvantage
In the following, I am going to argue that immigrants’ labour market disadvantage can be ex-
plained by four different drivers. First, as mentioned, differences in existing human and social
capital - read skills or employability - can determine labour market success relative to natives.
Second, a host-country’s society’s attitudes towards immigrants can affect their labour market
success. According to this concept of discrimination, (residual) differences in labour market
outcomes are explained by differential behaviour of a majority population towards its in-group
peers vis-a`-vis the immigrant out-group. Third, specific policies can affect individual human
capital endowment (e.g. acquiring additional skills) and consequently alter the skill composition
of immigrants relative to natives. I label this integration-policy effects. Eventually, fourth, poli-
cies can also affect how immigrants are enabled to applying their existing skills. That is, such
immigration-policy effects do not change individual skill composition, but affect how these skills
can be used in the host-country labour market, for instance, through recognition of educational
attainment.
One could formulate a very simplistic model of labour-market success of the following form:
Yi = β1 + β2Empi + β3Disi + β4Ipoli + β5Mpoli + 
... with Y being the specific labour-market outcome of individual i = {Mmigrant;Nnative}
belonging either to the native or immigrant population, with level of employability Emp and,
if i = M exposed (or not exposed if i = N) to discrimination exerted by the majority group
Dis, to direct integration policies affecting human capital endowment Ipol, and to indirect
immigration-related policies Mpol.
1.2.1 Differences in Employability
Referring to individual employability, the literature has shown that differences in skill endow-
ment can explain differences in labour market outcomes between natives and immigrants (or
between other groups, e.g. O’Neill 1990). Along these findings, proponents of a meritocratic
understanding of employability argue that - at least over time - achieved characteristics are more
important than ascribed characteristics; or, as described by Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992:6):
“What counts is increasingly what individuals can do, and not who they are.” Thereby, most
investigations focus on human and social capital aspects that require some ‘assimilative effort’,
such as acquisition of language skills or establishing social networks. However, it is impor-
tant to emphasise that theses studies almost unisono stress the fact that human and social
capital differences cannot account for the entire native-immigrant difference in labour market
outcomes. For instance, based on two independent large-scale surveys in the UK, Leslie and
Lindley (2001) and Dustmann and Fabbri (2003) find that English language ability among eth-
nic minority residents in Britain accounts for part albeit not all of the higher unemployment and
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lower earnings that this groups faces. A similar study on the Swedish case by Duvander (2001)
was not able to identify significant differences in unemployment risk and earnings if immigrants
acquire Swedish education, are proficient in the host-country language, or living with a native
partner (social ties). Grand and Szulkin (2002), in turn, show that country-specific human cap-
ital can reduce the earnings differentials particularly for those immigrant groups who are the
most disadvantaged in the Swedish labour market. Scholars have subsequently expanded this
meritocratic approach beyond host-country education and language proficiency towards a more
socio-cultural notion of employability. In reference to the seminal work of Granovetter (1973),
Bonoli and Turtschi (2015) and Lancee (2016), for instance, investigate the importance of so-
cial ties, especially how work-related contacts can improve immigrants’ employment chances.
Further, Koopmans (2016) has shown that productivity-relevant socio-cultural capital, such as
language proficiency, inter-ethnic social ties, and gender values, strongly affect labour market
participation of Muslim groups in Germany. Taking these socio-cultural traits into account ren-
ders differences in labour market participation and unemployment between native ethnics and
the Muslim groups minimised and largely insignificant. Similar results on the importance of
language proficiency on earnings are stressed, for instance, by Bleakley and Chin (2004) and
Isphording (2013). In an article based on encompassing survey data, which has been merged
with administrative information by the unemployment registry in the Swiss canton of Vaud, we
investigate whether such productivity-relevant socio-cultural traits could provide an explanation
for immigrants’ prolonged unemployment durations (Auer et al. 2017). The public debate some-
times ascribes weaker work values to immigrants (e.g., acceptability of remaining on benefits),
which, in turn should explain higher unemployment rates. Indeed, we find that - next to edu-
cational attainment - social-capital characteristics in form of the quality of a person’s informal
network, higher levels of psychological well-being, and indicators of unemployment being a bur-
den (‘work ethics’) significantly reduce unemployment durations of immigrants. However, they
explain only a small share of the overall disadvantage that some immigrant groups experience.
We conclude that at least some of the large differences we observed in unemployment durations
are likely to be due to other factors including discrimination by employers (see section 2.2 below).
In addition, heterogeneity in the effect of skills on labour market success between natives and
migrants stems from the fact that employer’s assessment of skills (i.e. perceived productivity)
varies across groups. As stressed for instance by Friedberg (2000), “the national origin of an
individual’s human capital is a crucial determinant of its value.” He shows that foreign skills
acquired through education or labour-market experience are valued less than domestic ones and
that this penalty accounts for the entire earnings disadvantage of immigrants in Israel. This
finding has been corroborated for other labour markets, such as the Canadian (see Ferrer and
Riddell 2008). For the United States, Chiswick and Miller (2009) infer that a malfunctioning
international transferability of skills leads to situations of over-qualification of immigrants in var-
ious jobs, which increases with an immigrant’s level of education and a short period of residence
in the US. The same increasing shape of the penalty on non-domestic human capital has been
highlighted Barrett et al. (2012). Similarly pointed out by Dahlstedt and Bevelander (2010)
for Sweden and Buzdugan and Halli (2009) for Canada, and recently Lancee and Bol (2017)
for 11 European countries, assessments of human capital quality in terms of years-in-education
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disregard the decisive effect attached to place of acquisition (host-country or country of origin),
with a possible plethora of influencing factors in-between.
In sum, differences in employability between natives and immigrants depict an important
piece of the puzzle explaining immigrants’ labour market disadvantage. However, neither do
differences in skills fully explain differential outcomes, nor do they answer the question of why
these differences exist in the first place. In the following sections, I am going to provide three
types of factors that influence immigrants’ (perceived) employability and its match with the
demands of a host-country’s labour market.
1.2.2 Social Distance Perceptions and Discrimination
Initially, a large number of studies attribute differences in labour-market success between natives
and immigrants to (ethnic) discrimination against the minority group, that is, the systematic
differential treatment of individuals based on group association.3
A growing literature has shown that the occurrence of discrimination is not a dichotomous
phenomenon. Rather, a more graduated approach applies, according to which group-preference
or disadvantage patterns are heterogeneous and depend on a complex web of various dimen-
sions affecting the perceived cultural or social proximity between two individuals or groups.
This differential perception of distance leads to so-called ethnic hierarchies (Hagendoorn 1993
and 1995; Fibbi et al. 2006; Auer et al. 2018), which is often defined as the degree of ‘sym-
pathetic understanding’ for another group (Bogardus 1959; Alba and Nee 1997; Ebner and
Helbling 2016). In the labour-market context, lower social distance, for instance because of a
shared language or a common history between two groups, comes with a higher likelihood of
economic success, since discrimination-induced disadvantage is absent or less severe compared
to individuals who are perceived to be socially more distant (e.g. Portes and Rumbaut 2001;
Van Tubergen et al. 2004). Despite a general acknowledgement of the existence of social dis-
tance perceptions, their measurement represents a rather contested field. For the Swiss case,
we base our concept of social distance on existing research, corroborated by national legislation
and interviews with involved actors. As described in Section 1.1 above, Switzerland relies on a
tiered immigration regime, which strongly differentiates between immigrants from countries per-
ceived as socio-culturally close (European Union/EFTA) and so-called 3rd-countries. Moreover,
a foreign nationality - especially in the case of 3rd-country citizens - often overlaps with other
easily observable traits such as ethnicity and/or religion. Such markers of group membership
are an important source of discrimination in all social spheres, not least in the labour market
(e.g. Weichselbaumer 2016). With respect to skin colour or religion, the notion of taste for dis-
crimination (Becker 1974) rather than productivity-related (statistical) discrimination (Phelps
1972) becomes a particularly plausible explanation for immigrants’ labour market disadvantage.
This notion of social distance is taken up, for instance by Ebner and Helbling (2016), who show
3Usually, discrimination is defined as an observable and unjust difference in the treatment of distinct groups.
However, in a related study (Auer and Ruedin 2018), we show that reporting discrimination depends on individual
traits that shape whether discrimination is accepted and whether immigrants identify with the host society.
We conclude that individual-level measures based on observable differences merely approximate discriminatory
patterns.
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that earnings of immigrants in Switzerland originating from countries with a very high social
distance are substantially lower than of ‘preferred’ immigrant groups. For a detailed description
of the operationalisation of social distance in the studies of this thesis, see Sections 2.2.1 and 3.4.
In order to uncover discrimination, either dichotomously or using the concept of social dis-
tance, quantitative research relies on two main methodological strands: First, studies on discrim-
ination often apply a so-called residual approach, where employment-relevant individual human
and social capital is accounted for as good as possible. The remaining differences in outcomes,
which consequently cannot be explained by differences in skills, occur because of unobserved
mechanisms, predominantly discrimination (e.g. Ballarino and Panichella 2015). We, too, con-
tributed to this literature with two studies on immigrants’ unemployment durations in the Swiss
canton of Vaud (see above Auer et al. 2017). Relying on the same hybrid data consisting of
administrative- and survey-information, we also investigate whether unemployed individuals who
were born abroad and/or held a foreign nationality differ in terms of re-employment chances
compared to native job-seekers (c.f. Auer and Fossati 2016). While causal evidence for dis-
criminatory practices is generally difficult to provide with registry data, with the hybrid data
source available to us, we follow the residual approach and argue for a design that minimises
potential alternative explanations. Our findings are based on real labour market behaviour and
show that, when controlling for human capital and employability criteria, individuals stemming
from non-EU countries and/or who are not born in Switzerland face unemployment durations
that are up to 80 days longer compared to Swiss natives, a penalty of almost 40 per cent.
The second strand of literature tries to circumvent the issue that residual studies face, that
is, claiming that discrimination is the most important among the arguably large ‘black box’ of
unobserved mechanisms. To avoid the need for relying on this strong assumption, differences
in labour-market outcomes are estimated using experimental data (e.g. Riach and Rich 2002).
Thereby, both, labour demand (“Imagine you are looking for an employee in ...”), as well as
individual skills can be kept constant across natives and immigrants. Moreover, the influence of
individual traits that are unobserved in administrative data, such as appearance, punctuality,
etc., can be minimised by either not stating, or by explicitly mentioning them, thereby, keeping
their influence constant across groups. Zschirnt and Ruedin (2017) have recently conducted a
meta-analysis of 43 experimental studies across 25 years, showing that “discrimination of ethnic
and racial minority groups in hiring decisions is still commonplace.” Related to this field of
research, we conducted two factorial survey experiments with HR managers and hotel employers
in Switzerland. In article #1, we propose a model that combines ethnic- and occupational
rankings to predict whom employers favour for particular occupations (the matching hierarchies
model ; Auer et al. 2018b). The results indicate that employers’ evaluations of non-natives follow
socio-cultural distance perceptions and that a non-native background leads to disadvantage
foremost in higher-skilled occupations. In low-skilled occupations, instead, having an immigrant
background is less detrimental. We conclude that, in order to understand disadvantage patterns,
it is important to be aware of contextual factors (occupational hierarchies) that may change
the nature of ethnicity-based discrimination. In a second factorial survey experiment, we test
whether HR managers’ discrimination against candidates with a non-native background can
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be counteracted by signalling assimilation into the (Swiss) host society (Fossati et al. 2017).
Here, we vary the nationality of the candidates and different signals of cultural attachment to
their background or to the host country. The findings reveal that candidates with Polish- and
Turkish-sounding names are evaluated worse than candidates with Swiss- and Spanish-sounding
names. More interestingly, however, signalling civic engagement within a traditional Swiss
volunteering organization increases the opportunities given to individuals born to Polish and
Turkish parents, while engagement in an organization connected to their parents’ background
dramatically damages their evaluation by prospective employers. We also show that candidates
born to Polish or Turkish parents, who whiten their CVs and who indicate fluency in only the
local language, fare much better than those who convey a cultural attachment to their country of
origin. We conclude that there are limited opportunities to ameliorate the evaluation of a CV by
signalling assimilation into the host country; conversely, non-whitened CVs and CVs that convey
multiple signals of attachment to one’s culture of origin are heavily sanctioned by assessments
of lower productivity. In sum, both methodological strands, residual as well as experimental,
describe an arguably unambiguous picture of immigrants being exposed to discrimination in
various aspects of the labour market.
1.2.3 Integration-Policy Effects
As shown above, immigrants can lack the skills required for a host-country’s labour market.
They are also often exposed to discrimination on behalf of the majority population. However,
countries have introduced regulations and policies that also affect immigrants’ skills composition
and how they can apply them. Therefore, it would be hasty to ascribe immigrants’ labour mar-
ket disadvantage entirely to their ‘unfitness’ or to natives’ ‘unwillingness’ to host and integrate
foreigners.
The first type, integration-policy effects, consists of policies that interfere with individual
human-capital endowment, that is, they change the skills that an immigrant (or native) can
put forward. Depending on the breadth of conceptualisation, one can identify many policies
qualifying as integration policies. For instance, a government’s decision to expand compulsory
years of kindergarten participation alters individual years of schooling and, hence, the skills of
all children involved (e.g. Margo and Finegan 1996; Duflo 2001). One particular area of research
is dedicated to investigating effect-heterogeneity of policies related to human capital and labour
market outcomes, either between natives and immigrants, or between other groups within a soci-
ety (e.g. Card 1999; Chiswick and Miller 2008). We contribute to this literature by investigating
the assignment mechanism to and the consequences of participation in training programmes and
occupational measures under so-called Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs).
Industrialised countries, including Switzerland, invest largely into measures that seek to
mitigate potential hurdles, which might occur when immigrants try to enter the labour market.
These measures range from language courses and job-related training to professional qualifica-
tions. Participation in such activation measures, with the goal of bringing jobless people back
into employment, is often beneficial for unemployed individuals, particularly if their employabil-
ity is low. However, some measures can affect labour market outcomes, such as unemployment
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duration or post-unemployment wages, even in a negative manner due to human-capital depriva-
tion, lock-in effects, or negative signals (e.g. Falk et al. 2005; Liechti et al. 2017; Auer and Rose
2018). For instance, Card et al. (2015) conclude that the labour-market effects of most ALMPs
are close to zero in the short run and modestly positive 2 to 3 years after programme comple-
tion. Gains seem to be bigger for those interventions that focus on human-capital enhancement
and wage subsidies in private companies (see also Martin and Grubb 2001). Kluve (2010) finds
positive effects for wage subsidies and ‘services and sanctions’ and modest positive effects for
training programmes, but negative effects for occupational programmes. For Switzerland the
picture is similarly mixed and whether an ALMP is beneficial or detrimental for a participant’s
employment outcomes eventually depends on the type of programme (e.g. Duell et al. 2010).
Lalive et al. (2008) apply a timings-of-event approach and find that none of the Swiss activation
policies shortens unemployment duration. Arni et al. (2015) find that both, supportive and
restrictive assignment strategies of caseworkers prolong unemployment duration, but the former
increase while the latter decrease earnings.
In article #2, we elaborate and test a theoretical model of assignment to different ALMPs
by caseworkers in the local job-center (Auer and Fossati 2016b). Based on administrative data
that covers all newly registered job-seekers in Switzerland between 2010 and 2012, we find evi-
dence for a systematic access bias against immigrants, whereby caseworkers assign unemployed
individuals based on an so-called competition logic, which is driven by economic incentives, the
job-centre’s performance evaluation, and the anticipation of employer discrimination against
immigrants. From the perspective of immigrants’ labour-market integration, this may be prob-
lematic because it results in an over-representation (under-representation) of immigrants in
activation measures with little (high) efficacy. Conversely, Swiss citizens are advantaged in ac-
cessing measures that promote human capital enhancement and that have been shown to be
successful tools for labour-market reintegration (e.g. Bonoli 2010). It is plausible that this
competition logic amplifies the general labour market disadvantages that immigrants must face.
In other words, ALMPs as one form of policies that directly influence a person’s skills, turn out
to favour natives over immigrants in Switzerland.
At the same time, in a related study, we provide evidence that taxpayers’ money for such ac-
tivation measures is in fact better spent on immigrants than on natives (Auer and Liechti 2017).
We arrive at this conclusion by investigating native-immigrant heterogeneity in participation
effects of different active labour market programmes on employment probability, wages, and
subsequent benefit recipiency, a topic which has been widely under-researched.4 Theoretically,
we argue that heterogeneous effects can provide information about the type of discrimination
immigrants are possibly confronted with in the labour market (see section 2.2). Using encom-
passing administrative data from Switzerland, we observe all registered job-seekers in 2004,
trace their past employment records and follow their monthly labour market trajectories over
10 subsequent years. Our findings are in line with earlier evaluations of ALMPs in Switzer-
land and elsewhere, which find that participation effects are limited and often even negative,
independently of the type of labour market outcome (e.g. Card et al. 2010; Kluve 2006). How-
4For notable exceptions see, for instance, Butschek and Walter (2014).
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ever, compared to natives, participation effects for migrants are more positive (less harmful)
for effective (ineffective) activation measures. That is, employers value the additional produc-
tivity information of migrant candidates. These effects are statistically robust, substantial in
magnitude, and stable across 10 post-unemployment years. Referring to section 1.2.2 above, we
infer that labour market discrimination against migrants is based to a large extent on statistical
reasoning on behalf of prospective employers (see also Baert and De Pauw 2014).
In sum, we find that, first, activation policies do seem to affect individual human capital (or at
least employers’ perception of changes in skills). Second, we show that effect-heterogeneity seems
to favour immigrants (or generally individuals with lower perceived initial employability). This
means that targeted investment in ALMPs can render activation policies successful. However,
third, we also provide evidence that assignment mechanisms to the most successful measures
in Switzerland largely favour natives over immigrants, thereby widening the gap in (perceived)
employability between natives and immigrants, instead of closing it.
1.2.4 Immigration-Policy Effects
While active labour market measures and education policies in general affect individual human
capital directly, and, as shown, possibly incur differences between natives and immigrants, other
policies may affect immigrants’ employability in an indirect manner. This is the case if regu-
lations interfere with immigrants’ access to the labour market or even to ‘exerting their own
skills’ in a way that deviates from the majority group, that is, natives. For instance, after
the enlargement of the European Union in 2004, most of the EU-15 imposed labour market
restrictions for the new member states. These restrictions did not prohibit free movement of
people per se, but disallowed immigrants to pursue professions in very specific branches of the
host-country economy. Subsequently, heterogeneity in restrictions led to a relatively stronger
influx of workers in more easily accessible labour markets, such as the UK, compared to more
restrictive ones, such as Germany (e.g. Brenke et al. 2009; Holland et al. 2011).
Another field of occupational regulation, which has been subject to many studies in the
social science literature, is characterised by restrictions regarding the recognition of foreign cre-
dentials, that is, education (e.g. Bauder 2005; Kogan 2006; Geis et al. 2013).5 Often, immigrants
have the skills required for a specific job recognised in their country of origin, but not in their
host country, because requirements regarding content or duration of a qualification differ across
countries, or simply because governments feel the need to protect their native work force. The
impact of this phenomenon on immigrants’ labour market success becomes more prevalent (and
researched) in times when movements occur for political reasons and recognition of certificates
becomes a secondary reason to decide over emigration.
Hence, immigration-related policies affect whether immigrants are able to ‘access their ex-
isting human capital’ and whether they have access to jobs suited for their skill set. Both
restrictions arise for asylum seekers in most industrialised (read: highly regulated) countries,
5Often labelled Social regulation of labour markets in the context of non-orthodox economics (e.g. Hanson and
Pratt 1995).
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where they face difficulties in getting their professional training recognised and are exposed to
work restrictions for different periods and sectors. In Switzerland, randomised attribution of
asylum seekers across the country (e.g. Couttenier et al. 2017; Slotwinski et al. 2018) and its
different language regions leads to a special type of ‘accessibility of individual skills’, which I
investigate in article #3 (Auer 2018): The Swiss policy of random (and binding) placement of
asylum seekers across sharply separated language regions within the country allows to estimate
the causal effect of language skills on employment chances, as refugees are exogenously placed
across regions where the spoken language could either match or deviate from individual language
skills. The results of this natural experiment show a substantially higher probability of finding
employment when asylum seekers are placed in regions with a lingua franca that matches their
individual language skills. In a second analysis, referring to integration policies presented in
section 1.2.3 above, I show that language course participation can offset the reduced likelihood
of employment in cases of a language mismatch. That is, promisingly, providing an activation
measure that directly affects the (language) skills of refugee-job-seekers turns out to be beneficial
for these individuals’ labour market success.
Overall, several of our studies contribute to the body of literature that investigates policy-
induced disadvantages of immigrants in the labour market, thereby stressing the need to look
beyond the unidimensional aspects of discrimination and skills-mismatch. In fact, we highlight
that integration and immigration policies can play a decisive role for immigrants labour market
success. As I will highlight in the next section, a question of fundamental importance for future
research is to investigate how such policies are interlinked and possibly mutually self-reinforcing
with immigrants’ skill deficits and their exposure to discrimination.
1.3 Conclusion
In sum, discrimination continues to be a plausible explanation for differences in labour-market
outcomes between natives and immigrants. While survey-based analyses (Auer and Ruedin
2018) and residual approaches (e.g. Auer and Fossati 2016; Auer et al. 2017) have to rely
on strong assumptions, the findings of such broad analyses among representative population-
samples are repeatedly confirmed by experimental studies (e.g. Fossati et al. 2017; Auer et al.
2018 and article #1: Auer et al. 2018b).
At the same time, immigration-related policies can be decisive, yet sometimes negative fac-
tors for immigrants’ labour market success.
On the one hand, we show that enhancing immigrants’ human capital can turn out to be
a powerful tool to mitigate differences in labour market outcomes, even among the most vul-
nerable groups such as asylum seekers (article #3: Auer 2018). In fact, we provide evidence
that active labour market measures are more beneficial (respectively less detrimental in case of
ineffective programmes) for immigrants than for natives (Auer and Liechti 2017). We provide
a possible explanation based on for this finding in related studies (Auer and Rose 2018; Liechti
et al. 2017), where we argue that statistical discrimination dominates employers’ perception.
From a policy perspective, this can be regarded promising insofar as relevant adaptations in
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the incentive structure of caseworkers and a subsequently improved assignment of immigrants
to beneficial activation measures can have positive effects on their employment success.
On the other hand, we have shown that the effects of integration and immigration policies
currently in place in Switzerland are often detrimental for immigrants’ skill acquisition as well
as skill utilisation, thereby hampering immigrants’ labour market integration instead of pro-
moting it (Auer and Fossati 2016b; Auer 2018). Whether these effects are unintended or the
result of a self-reinforcing interdependency with (ethnic) discrimination in a society, remains to
be answered case-by-case. Future research should therefore investigate the foundations of such
policies and their implementation. Are restrictive or detrimental immigration-related policies
the result of widespread sentiments among the native population? Do such policies reinforce
the harmful nature of discrimination against immigrants? For activation measures in Switzer-
land, this assumption seems to hold, as we show that migrants are overrepresented in activation
measures with little efficacy (article #2: Auer and Fossati 2016b). Arguably, this is because
caseworkers are able to shift the blame of discriminatory behaviour towards potential future em-
ployers. Put differently, discrimination affects street-level bureaucrats in their decision-making,
which they justify by employers’ negative evaluation of immigrants, which, in turn, is justi-
fied by immigrants’ lack of labour market fitness, which, again, is emphasised by detrimental
policies and selective assignment to activation programmes by job-centre caseworkers. If po-
litical or societal goals do not prioritise immigrants’ integration, such self-reinforcing patterns
can easily occur. In contrast to incidents of statistical discrimination, counteracting people’s
taste for discrimination provides a challenge that goes beyond short-term labour-market policies.
In order to achieve a better understanding of the fundamental drivers of immigrant em-
ployment disadvantage, future research should put its focus on discrimination formation. What
motivates systematic disadvantaging of minority groups? Is the policy-making process biased to-
wards compliance with its constituents’ perception instead of facilitating immigrant integration?
And, if yes, how can this self-reinforcing interdependency be broken?
1.4 Outlook
In the following, I briefly present three avenues for expanding this thesis and for conducting
future research in the field of labour market integration of immigrants.
What ‘Triggers’ Discrimination?
Together with Didier Ruedin (Universities of Neuchaˆtel and Witwatersrand), we are designing a
vignette study that will test the trade-off between discrimination and economic utility. Thereby,
we randomly vary the scarcity of resources (in our case: employees, work colleagues, social net-
works) to assess whether and to what extent respondents change their discriminatory stance
when confronted with situations where, for instances, labour supply is scarce, that is, when they
can only choose from a limited number of job candidates.
Related, together with colleagues from NCCR and the Swiss Forum for Migration (SFM),
Julie Lacroix, Eva Zschirnt, and Didier Ruedin, we are currently running a large-scale experi-
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ment on discrimination in the Swiss housing market. By conducting this correspondence study
on the national level and across all levels of urbanisation, we are able to better understand the
effect of scarcity (here: supply of suitable renters of an apartment) on discriminatory practices.
Hence, both studies will advance our knowledge on the nature and drivers of discrimination
(statistical vs. taste).
A ‘Large-Scale Integration Experiment’
While random attribution of asylum seekers in Switzerland and elsewhere gains much attention,
a common European placement mechanism - once introduced on a large scale - will likely resort
to a similar logic. It will be interesting to test economic and societal effects of some exogenously
imposed placement in a region of almost 500 million residents.
Until then, I seek to conduct a study whereby I make use of differences in placement reg-
ulations across European countries. Other countries besides Switzerland, such as Germany,
the UK, and - partly - the Scandinavian countries, have introduced a quasi-random placement
mechanism. Circumventing the issue of self-selection into a specific host-country, exploiting the
differences in placement mechanisms across European countries can (a) provide robust evidence
on the key drivers that constitute successful labour market integration, and (b) provide valuable
insights about the (economic) consequences of different placement mechanisms.
Book Spin-Off
We conducted several studies using different methodological approaches, different underlying
data structures, and different population samples. To a surprising extent, however, our find-
ings have been consistent throughout. Independently of perspective, we find stable patterns of
immigrant-disadvantages in terms of employment outcomes, access to the labour market, and
access to human-capital-enhancing programmes. Thereby, we contribute to the literature on
active labour market policies and the different mechanisms that define a programme’s efficacy.
We further link participation in activation measures with heterogeneous effects on labour mar-
ket outcomes between groups. Eventually, we show that ALMP efficacy and labour market
outcomes are mirrored in the perception of candidates and of activation measures by potential
employers, thereby, describing their so-called signalling value in several ways. It stands to reason
that a book jointly written by the co-authors of these studies provides a promising possibility
to elaborate and structure our findings.
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2 Article #1: The Matching Hierarchies Model
The matching hierarchies model: Evidence from a
survey experiment on employers’ hiring intent
regarding immigrant applicants
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Abstract
We seek to understand why immigrants encounter labor market integration difficulties and thus propose a model
that combines ethnic and occupational rankings to predict which candidates employers will favor for particular
occupations (a matching hierarchies model). In a Swiss survey experiment, we found that employers’ evaluations of
non-natives follow socio-cultural distance perceptions and that a non-native background is a disadvantage mainly
in high-skilled occupations. In low-skilled occupations, having an immigrant background is less detrimental. In
elucidating disadvantage patterns, we conclude that it is important to consider contextual factors (occupational
hierarchies) that may change the nature of nationality-based discrimination.
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2.1 Introduction
Labor-market access is key to successful social and economic integration in every society. In
today’s world of steadily growing immigration and refugee movements, elucidating why certain
groups of immigrants face more difficulties than others in accessing the labor market has be-
come particularly relevant to preventing increasing social inequality (Heath and Cheung 2007).
This study focuses on employers’ hiring behavior because eventually, employers decide which
candidates are hired or promoted and consequently are at least partially responsible for the dis-
advantages faced by specific groups in the labor market (Riach and Rich 2002; Rydgren 2004).
We contribute to the understanding of how employers make use of information pertaining to
candidates’ national origin in hiring decisions. More precisely, we develop a model that accounts
for instances in which natives are preferred over immigrants and for instances in which there is
no apparent discrimination against (or preference for) immigrant candidates. In other words,
we show that discrimination regarding non-native applicants is not generalized but is instead
primarily applicable to more skilled occupations and that, at least in the case of Switzerland, a
foreign background hardly hampers employment chances for ’undesirable jobs.’
This outcome can be explained by understanding that employers are striving to find a good
match between two hierarchical systems. On the one hand, societies construct ethnic hierar-
chies that rank individuals with immigrant backgrounds based on the perceived social distance
of various immigrant groups from the host society (Hagendoorn, 1993; 1995). On the other
hand, jobs are also ranked in an occupational hierarchy based on perceived social status (e.g.,
Inkeles and Rossi, 1956; Goldthorpe and Hope 1972; Ganzeboom et al. 1992). During the hiring
process, employers use these two ranking systems to choose one applicant, from among equally
qualified candidates, whose nationality best matches the vacant job’s hierarchical position.
We investigate the question of how employers use information regarding national origin in
hiring decisions, drawing on data from a survey experiment with employers in the Swiss hotel
sector. Switzerland is an interesting case for several reasons. First, the country is host to a
large and diverse group of immigrants, allowing us to determine the differential effects of various
nationalities in different occupations. Second, although the current political climate might fos-
ter increasing disadvantages for immigrants , economic circumstances counteract this tendency.
This is largely because Switzerland faces a labor shortage in various branches – a so-called
Fachkra¨ftemangel (B, S, S. 2014). Immigrants might thus be expected to face fewer obstacles in
Switzerland than in countries with an abundant supply of qualified labor. Third, Switzerland
is also a convenient case to study employers’ hiring preferences because the topic of immigrant
labor is currently receiving much attention, as an immigrant quota system looms. Hence, it
might be expected that employers will unveil their true preferences more readily because they
are afraid of being neglected in the political game.
The hotel sector is particularly suitable for testing our model because it relies heavily on
immigrants and is defined by its international orientation. As a result, employers we contacted
in this industry are accustomed to evaluating candidates of different nationalities. In addition,
hotels provide jobs situated throughout the occupational hierarchy. Some occupations, such as
room cleaners, are among the least desirable in terms of wage, working hours, (physical) dis-
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comfort, and social recognition, while others, such as reception jobs, are better paid and have a
better social image.
In our experimental survey, Swiss hotel managers were asked to indicate how likely they
were to hire hypothetical applicants with different profiles. Thereby, the candidates’ national-
ity, gender, age, education, labor-market history (captured by participation in an active labor
market measure, such as training or an occupational programs), and hobbies were varied ran-
domly. The advantage of factorial experiments is that they allow numerous factors to be varied
contemporaneously and thus facilitate joint exploration of different sources of and mechanisms
triggering disadvantage.
Our findings confirm the theoretical expectation that nationality plays a significant role in
hiring but also show that its effect depends on the occupational profile (low-skilled vs. medium-
skilled job). Although a foreign nationality leads to a clear disadvantage for positions ranked
higher in the occupational hierarchy, we find no evidence that having a foreign nationality is
disadvantageous for positions at the lower end of the hierarchy, which indicates that employers’
discrimination against immigrants is not homogeneous across the labor market.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 sets out the theoretical framework
for labor-market disadvantage in terms of different nationalities and how such disadvantage is
linked to the occupational hierarchy. Section 3 describes the experiment, the data, and the
methods applied to test our hypotheses. Results are presented in Section 4. Finally, Section 5
discusses the study’s implications.
2.2 Theory: explaining immigrants’ labor market disadvantage
We know that immigrants face disadvantages in various areas of the labor market (Riach and
Rich 2002; Fibbi et al. 2006; Fleichmann and Dronkers 2010; Auer et al 2017). For instance,
immigrants may suffer from lower hiring chances (Carlsson and Rooth 2007; Kaas and Manger
2011; Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004), lower promotion likeliness (Blank et al. 2004; Pierce
2012), and lower wages (Ebner and Helbling 2016; Blank et al. 2004; Braddok and McPartland
1987). All these factors contribute to constraining immigrants’ social mobility (Pierce 2012;
Blank et al. 2004; Ebner and Helbling 2016).
The literature has also shown that immigrants face a conspicuous level of disadvantage
compared to natives, even after controlling for compositional differences (often called ’ethnic
penalties’) (Rydgren 2004; Arai and Vilhelmsson 2001; Ballarino and Panichella 2015). For this
reason, we analyze the demand-side mechanism or employers’ hiring behavior (not the supply-
side mechanism, such as candidates’ traits) that leads to potential disadvantage for applicants
with a non-native background. In fact, employers are the gatekeepers whose decisions regarding
who will be hired have important consequences and shape the very structure of labor-market
disadvantage. As Acker (1990) explains for gender, discriminatory practices become a substan-
tive issue when they are institutionalized in asymmetric power structures that systematically
channel minority applicants into less attractive positions. Thus, a better understanding of hiring
decisions might help prevent the spread of such automatisms.
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Drawing on social psychology and discrimination theory, we propose a model that explains
employers’ hiring behavior and – more precisely – how different types of hierarchical information
are used to choose suitable candidates for specific occupations. We argue that two mechanisms
affect employers’ hiring decisions. On the one hand, employers evaluate a candidate’s nationality
within the framework of a pre-existing ethnic hierarchy in a particular society. In this manner,
employers consider traits, such as social distance, work attitudes in the form of stereotypical
perceptions of working morale, anticipation of customer preferences for particular groups, etc.
On the other hand, employers have an understanding of the occupational hierarchy (i.e. how
a job is regarded in terms of social status, prestige, etc.), as Section 2.3 discusses. Our model
predicts that employers match these types of information to maximize the fit between an appli-
cant’s position within the ethnic hierarchy and the occupation’s position within the social status
scale. In other words, the interplay of these hierarchies determines how an employer evaluates
candidates.
2.2.1 Ethnic hierarchies
Several studies have shown that employers generally use the information conveyed by place of
origin and/or nationality in their hiring decisions (e.g. Baumle and Fosset 2005; Midtbøen
2013). However, understanding how ethnic hierarchies are created and what mechanisms un-
derpin these perceptions is complex and controversial. Informed by social psychology, we know
that individuals automatically impose classifications on people (Reskin 2000) and that members
of in-groups are preferred in social interactions (Hagendoorn 1993). Theoretically, this prefer-
ence for in-group members entails multiple advantages. For instance, in-group contacts ease
communication due to shared “cultural understandings” (Hutnik 1991). Moreover, in-group
contacts foster a supportive and cohesive environment (Sumner 1906) and strengthen their own
identity relative to other groups (Tajfel 1982; Snellman and Ekehammar 2005). Unsurprisingly,
individuals not only prefer to interact with in-group members but also evaluate other in-group
members higher than they evaluate out-group members (Reskin 2000). In the context of hir-
ing decisions, in-group membership translates into a lower level of (perceived) uncertainty for
employers (including with respect to work attitudes) and into more positive evaluations. As a
consequence, we expect (native) employers to generally prefer native applicants over applicants
with a different national background.
In multi-ethnic societies, a more fine-grained classification that ranks out-group members
within a hierarchical system seems more appropriate than a dichotomous distinction. The
literature has shown that the concept of social distance is helpful with regard to understanding
the nature of this ranking (Hagendoorn 1993; 1995 and Hagendoorn et al. 1987). As a concept,
social distance dates to Park (1923) and Bogardus (1925; 1959), who established a measure to
study interethnic relations . These authors defined social distance as the “degree of intimacy
and understanding” that characterizes relationships between individuals and groups (Park 1923:
39) . The concept of social distance is inherently multidimensional and is determined by at least
three factors. First, differences in the perceived socio-economic status of the group shape social
distance, with immigrants frequently clustering at the bottom of the social stratification system
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(Park 1923). Second, social distance is defined by the degree of perceived cultural overlap in
terms of language, habits, religion, and – particularly in the labor market – work-related values,
including work morale, engagement, and precision, and other values (e.g. Hagendoorn et al.
1998; Auer et al. 2017). The third element that defines social distance is appearance, mainly skin
color and facial traits. These last characteristics may be of particular relevance for occupations
with a high level of customer contact, as argued by Becker (1957). These three dimensions
of what from now on we will refer to as “socio-cultural” distance frequently overlap because
immigrants concentrate in particular social classes , have a different cultural background from
natives, and are (more or less) easily identifiable because of physical characteristics (Ebner and
Helbling 2016; Hagendoorn 1993 and 1995) . However, it is not necessary for these components
to overlap, and they do not always. For instance, immigrants in the U.S. from Asian countries
face fewer difficulties integrating into the labor market than other immigrant groups (Kossoudji,
1988). In particular, it is plausible that Asians benefit from positive stereotypes linked to
work-related values assigned more weight by employers, who thus disregard other elements that
might trigger perceptions of greater distance (e.g., religion or language). Based on work-related
standards, Asian immigrants seem closer to US citizens than other groups who are less similar in
terms of work-related values but more similar in terms of physical appearance, for instance (Fiske
et al. 2002). In summary, socially constructed rankings are based on a multitude of dimensions
that seem to gain or lose relevance, depending on the groups of interest. With respect to hiring
situations, we hypothesize that employers who are (implicitly) aware of these rankings take them
into account but give more weight to those characteristics that convey information about workers’
expected productivity in the context of a specific occupation. Overall, the literature shows
that ethnic rankings are surprisingly consistent within this context (Snellman and Ekehammar
2005). For instance, individuals who share the same foreign background rank members of other
nationalities along social distance perceptions, as would members of the in-group (Hagendoorn
1993 and 1995). In other words, they conform to the ethnic hierarchy irrespective of their own
ethnicity and social status. In Northern European countries , individuals from Southern and
Eastern European countries are ranked closer to in-group members, whereas individuals from
the Middle East and Africa are located at the lower end of the ethnic hierarchy (Hagendoorn
1993; 1995 and Hagendoorn et al. 1987). The findings by Hagendoorn and colleagues mirror the
distance perceptions we find in Switzerland. Former immigrant groups from Southern European
countries (e.g., Italians and Spaniards) are today perceived as culturally close, together with
the recently immigrated Portuguese, particularly because of their reputation as hard workers
(Ruedin et al. 2013; Sta¨dler 2015; Wimmer 2004). Immigrants from the former Yugoslavia (e.g.,
Serbia and Kosovo) are instead associated with negative stereotypes, which are particularly
explicit in the tabloid media (Scherrer, 2012; BfM, 2010: 41; Fibbi et al. 2006; Wyssmu¨ller,
2005). Finally, immigrants from Muslim countries like Turkey occupy the most disadvantaged
position in the Swiss ethnic ranking system (Ruedin et al. 2013; Hainmueller and Hangartner
2013; Helbling 2010). These distance perceptions, which also involve productivity assumptions,
are relevant criteria when employers make hiring decisions.
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2.2.2 Job hierarchies
In modern societies, economic inequalities derive mainly from how different labor-market po-
sitions affect individuals’ social standing. In other words, working in a particular occupation
defines the economic class to which an individual belongs (see Erikson and Golthorpe 1992). The
effect of labor-market positioning is not limited to material wellbeing and affects social strati-
fication patterns more generally. Occupations are closely linked to three dimensions of capital
(economic, social, and cultural) that – to some extent – can be converted to one another and
that allow an individual to acquire a particular standing in society (Bourdieu, 1984). First, a
well-paid job is likely to lead to higher social standing than a low-paid job. Second, occupations
that require high levels of cultural capital (i.e., particular forms of knowledge and competencies
that are frequently “inherited” from family or acquired through education) also ensure higher
social position. Finally, social capital helps access good positions, but the reverse is also true, as
attractive positions open new opportunities for networking. In summary, an individual’s position
in a society is based on these three forms of capitals, which are then reflected in the occupational
structure. Thus, it follows that, as with ethnic rankings, occupations are ordered hierarchically
with respect to multiple dimensions (economic, social, and cultural). Unsurprisingly, sociological
research suggests a number of different ways to measure such occupational stratification . The
focus of these scales/indexes varies from measuring economic capital (wages) to more complex
schemes that attempt to also capture social stratification patterns (cultural capital). However,
all these schemes try to rank occupations based on some definition of desirability. Based on this
work, we expect that employers rank occupations in line with the social status associated with
a particular occupation.
2.2.3 The matching hierarchies model
When assessing their candidates, employers take both, the social-distance perception and the
occupational hierarchy into account. Initially, groups that are more distant are disregarded
because they are associated with less certainty about their productivity and overall fit with the
position (higher socio-cultural distance, especially different work attitudes) and because people
of other nationalities are generally evaluated more negatively than fellow nationals (in-group
evaluation bias ).
However, unattractive jobs can lead to downward social mobility and status loss for na-
tives. Thus, if a native worker applied for a job at the lower end of the occupational hierarchy,
potential employers would be left wondering whether this person might come with (negative)
traits that prevent her or him from applying for better jobs. In this context, an employer is
less inclined to strictly prefer a native applicant . Whenever an occupation conveys the image
of being “unsuitable” or “unattractive” for a native worker, an immigrant background almost
automatically signals a better fit for employers (Wingfield and Alston 2014; Piore 1979; Massey
et al. 1993; cf. Friberg 2012) . In addition, an immigration background may be advantageous
for an employer that expects a higher level of (long-term) commitment and motivation. Since
immigrants experience greater difficulties in finding a job, employers anticipate that they will
go to greater lengths to keep jobs that they have after being hired. As an illustration, Zinn and
Dill (1994) show that employers believe that (immigrant) women are ideal workers for many
32
jobs because they are more compliant and demand lower wages (Waldinger and Lichter 2003:
15).
To sum up, we hypothesize that employers hire members of a given nationality when the as-
sociated distance perception is consistent with and fits the vacant occupation. Figure 1 below
summarizes the theoretical argument and presents employers’ preferences as a combination of
job hierarchy and socio-cultural distance. Although the dualization literature divides applicants
into insiders and outsiders and argues that immigrants are more likely to find employment in
outsider jobs (Piore 1979), we argue for a more nuanced distinction. Instead of a dichotomy,
the distinctions are multidimensional and subject to employers’ matching strategies.
 
Figure 1: The matching hierarchies model: how employers select candidates based on social 
proximity and job hierarchy 
 
Figure 1: The matching hierarchies model: how employers select candidates based on social proximity and job
hierarchy
The hierarchy of a given job increases on the x-axis, w ereas an individual’s proximity to
the host society increases on the y-axis. The dotted line represents the best possible match
between a candidate’s socio-cultural distance and the job’s position in the occupational hierar-
chy. All else equal, the closer the applicant’s position to the diagonal, the better the fit. For
occupations perceived as undesirable, an immigrant background (i.e., low socio-cultural prox-
imity (black dot on the line)) constitutes a good – or at least reasonable – attribute relative to
natives. Conversely, as an occupation becomes increasingly attractive, in-group nationality (i.e.,
high socio-cultural proximity) becomes increasingly preferred. Combinations of proximity to the
host society and job hierarchies that are farther away from the dashed matching hierarchies line
represent a worse fit and are thus less likely to be realized in a hiring situation (hollow circles).
Up to a certain point, employers who cannot find applicants “close” to the optimal match
(dotted line) may hire less suitable candidates. However, if the candidates are too “far away”
(empty circles), they may resort to alternative strategies, such as revising the occupation’s de-
scription to better fit with the individuals who actually applied. As Pager et al. (2009) show,
employers – particularly those with more than one vacancy – attempt to either channel minor-
ity members into those openings that rank lower in the hierarchy or re-negotiate the job with
applicants. For instance, they might offer more responsibility, a better wage, or a more pres-
tigious job title to native applicants; conversely, they may “downgrade” the job for non-native
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candidates. In this sense, employers have quite some room to manoeuvre to reach or restore the
ideal hierarchical match.
The matching hierarchies’ theory comes with restrictions. In some contexts, nationality
might be a less relevant signal. In the instance of a high level of specialization or in the context
of a labor shortage (Baert and De Pauw 2014), for example, employers might have to resort to
individuals with foreign backgrounds although they would prefer hiring natives. The importance
of the matching hierarchies model might also be attenuated in highly internationalized work
environments and particularly at the very top of the occupational distribution (management
and research), where employers are used to hiring non-natives and/or where other candidates’
attributes become more important or convey less “fuzzy” information. In similar fashion, it is
possible that employers’ characteristics affect the importance of nationality or immigrant status
on the hiring process. More libertarian values, or being an immigrant oneself (i.e., in ethnic
labor markets), is likely to make nationality drop in relevance as a signal. The same might be
true when employers have the occasion to learn over an extended period and thus counteract
their stereotypical beliefs and assumptions regarding “normality”. As contact theory suggests,
recurrent interactions with non-native employees, particularly within a professional environment,
may lead to a correction of perceptions (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006).
2.3 The experimental setting: factorial survey design
Studying employers’ hiring behavior has proven difficult, due to the lack of data. Determining
which characteristics influence hiring decisions would require the researcher to know not only
the successful candidate but also the entire applicant pool. To overcome this problem, we study
employers’ hiring preferences in an experimental setting, simulating a hiring process for the
position of a receptionist (a medium-skilled, “fairly attractive” position) and a room cleaner (a
low-skilled, “rather unattractive” position) in the Swiss hotel sector. We focus on these two posi-
tions because they are the most common occupations in the hotel industry. Therefore, we expect
higher survey engagement because hotel employers are faced with a familiar hiring scenario. In
addition, the social policy relevance of focusing on low- and medium-skilled individuals is higher,
since most individuals with a migration background still have lower qualifications than natives
(BFS 2017) and since low-skilled workers are generally more at risk of becoming unemployed.
The advantage of conducting this study with hotel employers is that this sector has, first, a
highly fluctuating employment rate and, second, a generally high share of foreign employees,
which means that foreign applications are quite common. Moreover, we do not rely on conve-
nience samples but instead study actual hotel employers, who can better assess a job’s required
skills than a general population sample and who have been shown to reveal their preferences
more readily and “honestly” than human resources personnel (Waldinger and Lichter 2003: 25;
Midtbøen 2013: 1663). Moreover, in the current Swiss context, hotel managers have an interest
in revealing their true preferences based on the current labor shortage and the possibility that
contingents on workers are introduced, as a consequence of the bilateral negotiations with the
European Union.
We conducted a factorial survey experiment, which is a widely applied methodology ( Wal-
34
lander 2009) increasingly used to study employers’ hiring behaviors (van Beek 1993; Biesma
et al. 2007; Di Stasio and Ge¨rxhani 2015; Di Stasio 2014; de Wolf and van der Velden 2001;
Abraham and Damelang 2016). In factorial experiments, participants must rate or rank tasks
of fictitious descriptions (called vignettes) of situations or objects. In our case, we asked em-
ployers to evaluate two pairs of fictitious curriculum vitae (CV) on a 10-point Likert scale. This
paired conjoint setup has been shown to capture real-world decisions remarkably closely (see
Hainmueller et al. 2014). Such vignettes are advantageous in that they (i) reduce the risk of
attributing employers’ preferences to a characteristic that remains unobserved to the researcher
but is nonetheless observed by the employer, (ii) allow for testing several dimensions at the
same time, and (iii) are not prone to ethical concerns, as is the case for correspondence studies
(Zschirnt 2016). Moreover, it has been shown that vignettes deliver a more valid measurement of
attitudes and are less biased by social desirability than item-based techniques, such as standard
surveys, because it is more difficult to follow socially desirable patterns when several characteris-
tics associated with lower productivity or other disadvantage vary contemporaneously (Auspurg,
Hinz, and Liebig 2009).
In the reviewed CVs, we focused on the influence of six dimensions, each of which can assume
different values, which we varied randomly (see Table A2 in the appendix for the dimensions and
levels). We drew a sample (d-efficiency = 90.7; see Auspurg and Hinz, 2015) from all possible
combinations of characteristics, which allows us to estimate both single and interaction effects.
Overall, the main advantage of this method is that it enables us to randomize numerous indi-
vidual attributes in a single experiment (Andriessen et al. 2014: 240; Hainmueller and Hopkins
2014: 2) and thus not only compare one minority group to a majority group but also differentiate
among several groups of immigrants.
In the general description of the scenario, all candidates were declared as unemployed for 6
months because their previous employer closed his/her hotel as a result of his/her retirement. To
ensure that employers perceived candidates with an immigrant background to have mastered the
local language as well as native speakers – in addition to avoiding divergent assumptions regard-
ing the schooling returns for candidates of foreign nationality – we specified that all applicants
were schooled in Switzerland and were, thus, also well acculturated to Swiss society (Gordon
1964). Therefore, we expect our estimation of immigrants’ disadvantage to be conservative in
nature. We capture the level of immigrant disadvantage by how likely respondents were to hire
a candidate, as indicated in the survey. Of course, this is not a direct outcome measure; instead,
the rating presents a stated choice. However, studies such as Webb and Sheeran (2006) and De
Dreu et al. (2001) show that there is a high correlation between stated and actual behavior.
2.3.1 Operationalization of socio-cultural distance
For the operationalization of socio-cultural distance and the choice of nationalities with different
rankings, we rely on Hagendoorn (1995). We chose Portuguese applicants to represent southern
European countries, which, according to Hagendoorn (1995), rank lower than nationals of Nordic
countries. However, as discussed above, Portuguese workers are likely to be perceived as quite
close to Swiss employees due to their positive work attitudes and stereotype as particularly
35
hard workers. Next, we selected Serbians to represent nationals from the former Yugoslavia,
which should again be more distant particularly because of the possibility of different cultural
and religious backgrounds. Moreover, in Switzerland, minorities from this region are associated
with negative stereotypes in terms of character traits (aggressiveness, speeding motorists, etc.)
(BFM, 2010: 41; Besic, 2005; Wyssmu¨ller, 2005). Both communities are among Switzerland’s
largest immigrant groups. Finally, as representative of the most distant group, we chose Sene-
galese immigrants, who differ substantially in terms of culture and with respect to appearance .
Generally, immigrants from Africa still represent a smaller share of immigrants in Switzerland.
However, their number is steadily on the rise, as shown in Figure 2, and is thus an interesting
group to study with respect to possible future group-specific challenges.
Figure 2: The total number of foreigners for selected nationalities, 1990-2010 
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2.3.2 Data and estimation strategy
We collected data between September and November 2015, using an online survey sent to mem-
bers of Switzerland’s largest hotel employer organization. Surveys targeting employers and
particularly managers are often characterized by lower response rates than general population
surveys (Anseel et al. 2010). An important reason for this difference in response level is that
in contrast to general population surveys, it is not possible to draw additional samples if the
targeted response rate is not reached. Thus, from the beginning, we contacted all 1982 mem-
bers of the largest employer organization (which covers enough hotels to account for 80% of all
overnight stays in Switzerland) by means of postal mail. We informed them of the study and
that both the employer organization and the university had explicitly supported our research.
One week after sending this information, we sent an email with a personalized link, followed
by two waves of reminders (see Table S1a and Figures S1b and S1c in the appendix for the
experimental protocol).
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A total of 237 participants completed the survey, yielding a response rate of 12 percent, which
is comparable to other studies that have analyzed similar populations (Abraham and Damelang,
2016) and with to the insights provided by studies drawing on smaller sets of selected respon-
dents (Di Stasio 2014, Biesma et al 2007, de Wolf and van der Velden 2001). Generally, a low
response rate increases the risk that results are biased because of unknown respondent selection
in the sample. For instance, our sample has a slight overrepresentation of respondents from ur-
ban areas (see Table S3). However, these areas are normally more immigration-friendly, and, as
the tourism sector is more developed there than in rural areas, the demand for workers is higher.
As Cook et al. (2000) argue, the representativeness of responses is more important than
the actual response rate. Thus, in Table S3 in the supplementary materials, we show that
the distribution for a set of crucial macro-level variables of respondents and non-respondents is
similar among the two groups. Given the fact that the distributions of a number of important
respondent (and hotel) characteristics marginally differ between the contacted population and
the respondent sample, we expect our results to be unbiased in spite of our low response rate.
To identify the influence of the candidate’s characteristics, respondents’ overall rating of each
candidate was regressed on the vignette dimensions as independent variables (see Table S2 in
the supplementary materials). If specific assumptions hold, Hainmueller et al. (2014b: 10)
have shown, linear regression of the outcome on the vignette characteristics produces an unbi-
ased estimate of the so-called average marginal component effect (AMCE ), which represents
the marginal effects of a given attribute over the joint distribution of the remaining vignette
attributes. AMCE is unbiased if, first, there are no carryover effects, which means that a respon-
dent’s rating of one candidate or a pair of candidates cannot be influenced by the outcomes of
the previous rating task. Second, AMCE is unbiased if profile ordering does not affect ratings.
In a given pair of candidates, the individual rating does not depend on whether a candidate
has been presented in first or second place (in our case, on the left- or right-hand side of the
page). Third, for AMCE to be unbiased, candidate profiles must be properly randomized across
all respondents. This assumption holds by study design for the overall population. However,
randomization may be violated for the subsample that answered the survey, particularly if the
sample size is small. We provide a test for each key assumption below in Section 4.1. As two
pairs of candidates for each job have been presented to respondents, we must assume that the
ratings are correlated because of unobserved respondent characteristics. Therefore, we estimate
robust standard errors clustered at the respondent level, as suggested by Hainmueller et al.
(2014b).
The outcomes can be analyzed in three ways. Initially, we assume by study design that
respondents compare the candidates within each pair and assign their rating afterwards . Hence,
we recode the candidate-specific ratings into a binary choice variable that takes the value of 1 if a
candidate was preferred (had a higher rating than its counterpart) and 0 if the other candidate
was preferred, where 0.5 represents equal ratings. This approach represents the original way
to analyze conjoint experiments, and it can be argued that a choice situation most closely
approaches a real-world hiring scenario . In addition, we can further minimize potential bias
in ratings due to unobserved respondent characteristics (i.e., if a randomization on respondent
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characteristics that leads to a systematically higher or lower rating of candidates would have
failed). As a second piece of evidence, we retain the individual ratings and normalize them such
that they represent a continuous stated choice model ranging from 0 to 1, with 1 representing the
best candidate. Since we assume the individual ratings to be influenced by the other candidate
of the pair, we stick to standard errors clustered at the respondent level to account for the
possible non-independence of the ratings (Hainmueller et al. 2014b: 17). Finally, we performed
the analyses using multilevel regressions, following the suggestions of Steenbergen and Jones
(2002) and Auspurg and Hinz (2015). The results remain stable across all estimation strategies.
2.4 Results
Figure 3 below shows the vignette ratings by job type and by applicant nationality (descriptive
results). Although applicants with a Swiss background for the reception job are rated higher,
the low-skilled cleaning occupation depicts a rather similar picture for all nationalities (i.e., the
average rating for Swiss candidates aligns with the three migrant groups). This change is also
shown in the third plot of Figure 3: respondents’ rating of the Swiss candidates remains rel-
atively stable at approximately 5.5 points, whereas the three immigrant groups close the gap
between them and the Swiss candidates for the cleaning position.
 
Figure 3: Vignette ratings by job type and applicant nationality 
 
Figure 3: Vignette ratings by job type and applicant nationality
The descriptive finding that the effects of immigrant background differ by occupation (Figure
3) is confirmed by the regression analysis (Table 1).
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Table 1: The determinants of employers’ evaluation of applicants in two occupations 
 Cleaning Reception 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Nationality (reference: Switzerland)     
Portugal 0.06 0.05 -0.12**** -0.13**** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Serbia -0.05 -0.05 -0.19**** -0.20**** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Senegal 0.00 -0.01 -0.19**** -0.20**** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Gender (reference: male)     
Female 0.02 0.02 0.06**** 0.06**** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age (reference: 25 years)     
32 years 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
40 years -0.06* -0.06 -0.12*** -0.12*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Education (reference: obligatory)     
Secondary 0.21**** 0.21**** 0.16**** 0.15**** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
ALMP (reference: none)     
Training 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.03 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Subsidy 0.11** 0.09** 0.06 0.05 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Occupation 0.09** 0.09** -0.04 -0.05 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Two occupations 0.09** 0.08** -0.14**** -0.15*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Hobbies (reference: none/music)     
Volunteering 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Team sports -0.08* -0.07* -0.09* -0.09* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Kickboxing -0.09* -0.09** -0.08* -0.07* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Chess -0.05 -0.05 -0.08* -0.08* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Respondent characteristics+ no yes no yes 
Observations 948 920 962 926 
SE in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, and **** p < 0.001 
+ Respondent characteristics include age, gender, educational attainment, whether the respondent was born in 
Switzerland, as well as the language region in which the hotel is located, the local unemployment rate (cantonal 
level), and the share of foreigners employed in the hotel (as derived from the respondent’s answers in the 
accompanying survey). 
 
 
In more detail, Column 1 in Table 1 presents the regression of the choice variable for the
cleaning position on the full battery of vignette dimensions. The results depict no significant
differences between the four nationalities in the probability of being the preferred candidate for
the cleaning position . However, in descriptive terms, we find the ethnic hierarchy is predicted
by our model. In Column 2, we added respondent characteristics to the model, whereby the
results remain unchanged. These respondent characteristics include individual attributes of age,
gender, origin, educational attainment, and years of experience in hiring staff, in addition to
hotel-specific criteria (i.e., the Swiss language region in which the hotel is located, the share of
foreign staff in the hotel, and the local unemployment rate) to account for segregation at the
firm level and possible variation in labor supply (see Section 2.4. above).
Generally, the sign of the particular coefficients is as expected. For instance, older age and
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the individualistic and competitive sport of kickboxing lead to a negative sign that is significant
at the 10% level. The effects of education and specific active labor-market measures are instead
positive and thus associated with a higher probability of being the preferred candidate, indicating
that employers tended to choose the most employable individuals within a specific group. Thus,
among minority candidates for the cleaning position and majority candidates for the reception-
ist positions, employers preferred those applicants who could be expected to be most productive.
Columns 3 and 4 (with respondent characteristics) present the results for the reception
position. Although age and hobbies have similar effects, respondents seem to prefer female can-
didates in the reception position and are more skeptical of activation measures . The preference
for women might result from the higher female share in this occupation(s), although we made
sure that both positions were described as gender neutral. In terms of immigration background,
we find a negative effect that is large in magnitude and statistically highly significant. The
probability of moving from 0 to 1 (i.e., to be the preferred candidate) decreases for all immi-
grants. The average disadvantage of the different nationalities roughly follows that predicted
by the social distance literature and conforms to our matching theory, whereby the negative
effect size for Portuguese remains substantial (-0.13 points) but smaller than for the Serbian
and Senegalese candidates (-0.20 points).
Overall, the analysis seems to corroborate the hypothesis that ethnic rankings are mirrored
in the labor-market chances of the respective communities, as expressed by the hiring preferences
of employers in Switzerland. We predicted that immigrants would experience increased disad-
vantage for positions that are high on the occupational hierarchy. With regard to employers’
assessments in the cleaning services – an occupation that is not attractive for native workers – we
find that Swiss natives are no longer the preferred group. However, for a medium-skilled position
at the hotel reception, immigrants are strongly disadvantaged compared to Swiss natives. In
fact, nationality turns out to be the strongest driver of our sample of applicant characteristics.
At times, the literature argues that employers’ preference for natives over minorities is affected
by the level of customer contact expected in an occupation (e.g., reception versus back office).
Employers may be more reluctant to hire minority candidates who are easily identifiable because
they have trouble speaking the local language, have a strong accent, or are easily identifiable due
to physical characteristics. In our study, this customer contact should not decisively influence
the hiring choice because we specified that all candidates completed their education in Switzer-
land and because there should be no expected difference in either the quality of education or
language mastery between immigrant applicants and Swiss natives in this test. Moreover, in
term of facial traits, applicants from Serbia and Portugal are often indistinguishable from Swiss
natives . In other words, an employer seeking to guarantee that his or her customer will have
a “local” experience when interacting with a receptionist will find all our candidates – except
maybe those with a Senegalese background – should be interchangeable in terms of productivity.
We conclude that the degree of customer contact should not affect our results substantially.
We demonstrate the change in preferred choices from the receptionist to the cleaning position
for each nationality in Table 2 below. Although the Swiss demonstrate a strong and significant
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decrease in being the preferred group when shifting the job from receptionist to cleaner, all
immigrant groups exhibit an increase in their favoritism, with the difference for the Senegalese
– arguably the most distant of the three immigrant groups – being significant at the 10% level.
As a robustness check, we retained the (normalized) ratings of each candidate and repeated
the analysis. The results shown in Table A3 in the Appendix do not differ from those presented
in Table 1 above.
Table 2: Student’s t-test results for employer evaluation differences for cleaners and receptionists, 
by nationality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Swiss Portuguese Serbian Senegalese 
Stated choice -0.15**** 0.06 0.02 0.07* 
E(cleaner) - E(receptionist) (-4.06) (1.59) (0.65) (1.91) 
Observations 467 481 486 476 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, and **** p < 0.001 
 
2.4.1 Experimental robustness
To test our experimental results’ robustness, we performed a number of diagnostics, as suggested
by Hainmueller et al. (2014b). Initially, we measured the possibility of carryover effects. Given
the AMCE’s underlying assumptions described above, a respondent should maintain the same
choice regardless of any candidates she would see later or has seen already. We test this as-
sumption by estimating the AMCE separately for the two rounds of vignette-pairs for each job.
In Table A4.1 in the Appendix, the columns are labeled Round 1 and Round 2, respectively.
Given the small sample size, the results remain relatively stable for both jobs, which excludes
the possibility of strong bias in the results from strong carryover effects.
Next, we tested for profile order effects. According to the AMCE’s second assumption, re-
spondents should make choices in a given pair of vignettes independently of the candidate’s
ordering. Again, we test the AMCE separately, this time by the ordering of the candidate’s
nationality. The results shown in Table A4.2 remain stable, which indicates that the overall
effects are not influenced by whether a given nationality was assigned to the first or second
candidate in a given vignette pair.
Eventually, we tested for successful randomization of the candidates’ characteristics within
our sample of respondents. Since survey experiments are conducted based on respondents’
information within the questionnaire, it is impossible to compare the sample groups’ attributes
with those of the overall population. However, whether experimental groups are balanced within
a given sample can be tested by regressing respondents’ characteristics on the nationality of
candidates. As shown in Table A4.3, all candidate nationalities are statistically insignificant.
In addition, the omnibus F-test shows a p-value that is generally above 0.9, indicating that
randomization has worked well.
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2.5 Conclusions
We set out to test our theoretical model postulating that natives should not always be advantaged
compared to candidates with an immigration background and that the degree of disadvantage
instead depends on the occupation at stake. Indeed, we find applicants for more attractive,
medium-skilled positions (such as a receptionist) to be clearly advantaged if they are native. In
other words, in Switzerland immigrants suffer from high levels of disadvantage for positions that
are desirable for native workers based on occupational stereotypes. However, when an occupa-
tion is considered not “attractive enough” for native workers, an applicant from the out-group
is not disadvantaged because the occupational profile corresponds to the immigrant candidate’s
position in the system of ethnic hierarchies. In sum, foreign nationality seems to be a source of
double disadvantage: it not only hampers hiring chances in good jobs but also seems to increase
potential lock-in effects in bad jobs. In fact, individuals with a non-Swiss background have
an easier route than Swiss nationals in terms of accessing the least desirable positions in the
occupational hierarchy.
This paper makes both theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature on these
themes. First, we add to the theoretical debate on the causes of discrimination by proposing a
more refined theory explaining why and when individuals with foreign backgrounds encounter
difficulties on the job market. We argue that a simple insider-outsider dichotomy does not do
justice to employers’ hiring strategies, in fact, our results show that these differentiate depending
on the occupation a (minority) candidate postulates for. Second, experimental data on discrim-
ination remain rare in the Swiss context (for a laudable exception see Fibbi et al., 2006). Thus,
our results add to understandings of the patterns of disadvantage in Switzerland. Third, we
base our analysis of discrimination on responses of involved actors – the hotel managers – rather
than relying on readily available convenience samples (cf. Baert and De Paw, 2014). In fact,
many survey experiments proxy employers’ hiring behaviour relying on student samples. Con-
versely, we provide results reflecting the preferences of individuals directly involved in real-world
recruiting decisions.
We are aware that our study has shortcomings, not least because employers are a no-
tably difficult population to study (see Abraham and Damelang, 2017). Thus, we have low
response rates even when exerting rigorous efforts to increase participation. Nonetheless, given
the response/non-response comparison for the variables available for both groups, we have no
reason to believe that the analyzed sample deviates significantly from the target population (see
supplementary material).
However, the question remains whether our results are generalizable to other sectors. We
believe that the matching hierarchy logic applies to most occupations from low- to medium- to
high-skilled and particularly to jobs in which requirements and qualifications are flexible, as such
jobs make more room available for discrimination (Moss and Tilly, 2001; Dovidio and Gaertner,
2000). However, further research should test this question using more sectors, different occu-
pations, different immigrant backgrounds, and possibly comparative settings. It would also be
interesting to add further dimensions such as language proficiency, cultural and ethnic attach-
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ment, or foreign education to explore the patterns of immigrant disadvantage in more detail.
When seeking to understand the patterns of disadvantage of individuals with a foreign back-
ground, we conclude that it is important to be aware of the contextual factors that may change
the nature of obstacles that immigrants face. In particular, we show that nationality-based
signals may be contingent on occupational characteristics and may also interact with active la-
bor market policy participation, (Liechti et al. 2017), as we show elsewhere (Liechti et al. 2017).
These findings have several policy implications. First, more effort should be devoted to
eliminating access difficulties to medium-skilled jobs and to preventing lock-in effects in low-
desirability jobs. Research has shown that standardized application assessments and blinded
application procedures help reduce discrimination (for gender e.g., Bohnet, 2016). Thus, intro-
ducing minimal requirements for hiring professionals and anti-discrimination legislation – which
Switzerland does not have – might be helpful tools for reducing this disadvantage. Second, it
is important to foster promotion possibilities in low-skilled jobs to increase the social mobil-
ity of individuals who have difficulties accessing medium-skilled occupations immediately. This
might be achieved by investing in on-the-job training programs. Finally, awareness campaigns
and specialized training for employers with recruitment duties might alleviate the problem, in
addition to fostering a (seemingly) much-needed debate on inequality in the age of migration.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics of survey respondents (employers) 
 Mean / column % 
(Std. dev.) 
Language region (of hotel, col %)  
German 0.69 
French 0.22 
Italian 0.08 
Romanesque 0.02 
  
Regional unemployment rate 0.03 
 (0.01) 
Share of foreign employees (of hotel) 0.60 
 (0.24) 
Female 0.45 
 (0.50) 
Age   49.56 
 (10.28) 
Educational attainment (col %)  
Mandatory or other 0.10 
Professional education 0.16 
Professional higher education 0.51 
University 0.24 
  
Hiring experience in years 15.55 
 (9.74) 
Born in Switzerland 0.73 
 (0.44)    
N 237 
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Table A.2: Dimensions and levels of vignettes (cleaning and reception) 
Dimension Level 
Gender - Mr. (reference category) 
 - Ms. 
Nationality  - Swiss citizen, unmarried, without children (reference category) 
 - Portuguese citizen, unmarried, without children 
 - Serbian citizen, unmarried, without children 
 - Senegalese citizen, unmarried, without children 
Age - 25 years old (reference category) 
 - 32 years old 
 - 40 years old 
Education - Completed mandatory school in Switzerland   
 - Completed a 3-year apprenticeship1 program as merchandiser (receptionist) 
 - Completed a 2-year apprenticeship as hotel employee (cleaning) 
ALMP - (no mention) (reference category) 
 - Russian course paid by the job center (Training)  
 - 40% wage subsidy paid by the job center (Subsidy)  
 - Temporary employment program in the field of clothing recycling (Occupation) 
 - Temporary employment program in the field of clothing recycling and temporary 
employment in the packing sector (Two occupations) 
Hobby - Loves listening to music (reference category) 
 - Two times a week plays checks in the local association 
 - Two times a week practices kick-boxing 
 - Two times a week plays soccer (volleyball for female) with a local club 
 - Volunteers for an association taking care of the elderly  
1 Switzerland has a strong vocational education and training system (VET) in which most adolescents follow a 
dual track program that combines practical training at a company with theoretical classes for one or two days. 
There are programs for over 230 occupations, and most are three- or four-year VET programs with a federal 
diploma, there are shorter two-year programs years with a federal certificate. The two-year VET program as hotel 
employee consists of courses in laundry service, looking after guests, housekeeping, logistics, interior decoration. 
The three-year VET program as merchandiser consists of a course in German, a foreign language, economics, and 
communications. 
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Table A.3: The determinants of employers’ evaluation of applicants for cleaning and reception 
position using normalized ratings 
 Cleaning Reception 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Nationality (ref. Switzerland)     
Portugal 0.03* 0.03 -0.10**** -0.11**** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Serbia -0.02 -0.02 -0.12**** -0.13**** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Senegal -0.03 -0.03 -0.14**** -0.15**** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Gender (ref. male)     
Female 0.14**** 0.14**** 0.09**** 0.09**** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Age (ref. 25 years)     
32 years 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
40 years -0.01 -0.01 -0.07**** -0.07**** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Education (ref. obligatory)     
Secondary 0.11**** 0.12**** 0.09**** 0.09**** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
ALMP (ref. none)     
Training -0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Subsidy 0.03 0.04* 0.01 0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Occupation 0.00 0.01 -0.04* -0.04* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Two occupations 0.03 0.03 -0.07*** -0.08*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Hobbies (ref. none/music)     
Volunteering 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.00 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Team sports -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Kickboxing -0.03 -0.03 -0.04* -0.04 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Chess -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Respondent characteristics no yes no yes 
Observations 958 928 967 931 
SE in parentheses     
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, and **** p < 0.001     
+ Respondent characteristics include: age, gender, educational attainment, whether the respondent was born in 
Switzerland, the language region in which the hotel is placed in, the local unemployment rate (cantonal level), and 
the share of foreigners employed in the hotel (as derived from the respondent’s answers to the accompanying 
survey.) 
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Table A.4: Diagnostics tests for carryover, profile order, and randomization effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Table A.4.1: Carryover Effects 
 Cleaning Round 1 
Cleaning 
Round 2 
Reception 
Round 1 
Reception 
 Round 2 
Portugal 0.04 0.08 -0.11* -0.13** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
Serbia -0.04 -0.05 -0.14** -0.24**** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Senegal 0.01 -0.01 -0.15*** -0.21**** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) 
Observations 460 460 464 462 
 
Table A.4.2: Profile Order Effects 
 Cleaning First 
Cleaning 
Second 
Reception 
First Reception Second 
Portugal 0.03 0.07 -0.11*** -0.13*** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) 
Serbia -0.09* -0.05 -0.15** -0.24**** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
Senegal -0.02 -0.01 -0.15**** -0.25**** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) 
Observations 460 460 463 463 
 
Table A.4.3: Randomization 
 clean gender 
recep 
gender 
clean  
age 
recep 
age 
clean 
educ 
recep 
educ 
clean  
exper 
recep  
exper 
Portugal 0.01 -0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.15 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.21) (0.15) (0.02) (0.02) (0.21) (0.16) 
Serbia -0.02 -0.00 -0.42 -0.24 0.01 0.00 -0.19 -0.08 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.31) (0.22) (0.02) (0.02) (0.29) (0.20) 
Senegal 0.00 -0.01 -0.08 -0.22 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.14 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.19) (0.17) (0.02) (0.01) (0.21) (0.14) 
p omnibus F 0.92 0.99 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
p Bartlett's 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99 
Observations 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 
 
clean 
ch-born 
recep 
ch-born 
clean 
foreign 
share 
recep 
foreign 
share 
clean  
lang. reg 
recep 
lang. reg 
clean 
unempl 
recep 
unempl 
Portugal -0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Serbia -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.05 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) 
Senegal 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
p omnibus F 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.93 0.96 0.96 0.98 
p Bartlett's 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.96 0.89 0.97 0.99 0.98 
Observations 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 972 
SE in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, and **** p < 0.001 
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Supplementary Material
Table S1a: Experimental Protocol 
Date Step 
9 November 2015 Postal letter announcing the survey and a leaflet with more information on the survey 
11 November 2015 Electronic survey link 
16 November 2015 Reminder to those that had not yet responded 
23 November 2015 Second reminder to those that had not yet responded 
19 January 2016 Survey closed  
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Figure S1b: First screen vignette experiment 
 
 
 
Recruitment Decision Receptionist  
In this section we would like to capture your staff requirements the best possible. Instead of traditional question 
batteries, we will therefore present you four candidate profiles and ask you to evaluate them.  
The following candidates apply for a position as a receptionist in your hotel. All four candidates hand in a written 
application and have already worked as a receptionist in different hotels in Bern. They have lost their current 
position due to the closed down of the hotel six months ago and are currently unemployed and are looking for a 
new position.  
Figure S1b: First screen vignette experiment
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Figure S1c: Second screen vignette experiment 
 
Third screen vignette experiment: Two additional candidates in the same form as in the second screen 
Forth screen vignette experiment: All four candidates are presented next to one another and participants are asked to 
place them in their preferred order from 1 (liked best) to 4 (liked least).  
This experiment was followed by a second experiment for the position of a room-cleaner. The set up was the same as 
presented above.  
 
Please indicate for each candidate the likelihood that you would engage him for a position as a 
receptionist.  
(1=very unlikely; 10=very likely) 
You receive the written application of the candidates below.  Both have already worked as a receptionist in 
different hotels in Bern. They have lost their current position due to the closed down of the hotel six months ago 
and are currently unemployed and are looking for a new position.  
 Candidate 1 Candidate 2 
 Mr. G. 
 
Serbian citizen, unmarried, no children 
 
Is 32 years old 
 
Has completed a 2-years education as 
hotel employee  
 
Is currently in an occupational programme 
for the recycling of old cloths, before he 
completed one in packaging.  
 
In his free time he is volunteering for an 
organisation that support elderly people 
 
Ms. F 
 
Swiss citizen, unmarried, no children 
 
Is 40 years old 
 
Has completed compulsory education in 
Switzerland 
 
 
 
 
 
In her free time she likes to listen to music.  
Hiring (--)                                     (++) 
      1   2   3    4    5   6   7    8   9   10 
(--)                                     (++) 
      1   2   3    4    5   6   7    8   9   10 
 
Figure S1c: Second screen vignette experiment
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Table S2: Correlation Matrix for applicants’ and respondents’ attributes  
The tables below show the correlation between the different vignette dimensions from the rated vignettes and the correlation between the vignette 
dimensions and the respondents’ characteristics. As not every vignette of the entire vignette universe was rated, we draw a d-efficient sample, and 
the vignette dimensions are correlated with one another, although this correlation is close to 0. The correlation between the observed respondent 
characteristics and vignette dimensions indicate whether the random allocation of vignettes to the respondent has worked out. The vignette 
dimensions should not be correlated with the respondent characteristics, which would mean, for example, that female respondents should not have 
rated significantly more female vignettes than male respondents. The correlation indicated below indicates that randomization was successful, as all 
correlations are near 0 and non-significant.  
Table S2a: Pairwise correlation for the cleaning position vignettes, applicant and respondent 
characteristics 
 Gender Nationality Age Education ALMP Hobby 
Applicant/vignette variables      
Gender 1.00      
Nationality 0.01 1.00     
Age 0.00 0.04 1.00    
Education 0.04 -0.01 0.08** 1.00   
ALMP 0.01 0.02 0.06* -0.01 1.00  
Hobby 0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Employer/respondent variables 
Gender 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
Age 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.00 
Education 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 
N Employees 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 
Lang. Region 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
Unemployment  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: **Significant at the 5%-level and *Significant on the 10%-level.  
Table S2b: Pairwise correlation for the receptionist vignettes, applicant and respondent 
characteristics 
 Gender Nationality Age Education ALMP Hobby 
Applicant/vignette variables     
Gender 1.00      
Nationality 0.04 1.00     
Age 0.00 0.01 1.00    
Education -0.01 -0.06* 0.03 1.00   
ALMP 0.04 0.02 0.08** -0.05 1  
Hobby 0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 1.00 
Employer/respondent variables 
Gender 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
Age 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 
Education 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
N Employees 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
Lang. Region 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
Unemployment  0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
Note: **Significant at the 5%-level and *Significant at the 10%-level.  
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Table S3: Descriptive statistics comparing employers (respondents and non-respondents) 
for specific macro variables  
 Non-Respondents Respondents 
Language Region   
German-speaking 0.69 0.69 
French-speaking 0.21 0.21 
Italian-speaking 0.08 0.08 
Romanesque-speaking 0.03 0.02 
City Type   
Central city of agglomeration 0.26 0.29 
Agglomeration 0.23 0.25 
Isolate city  0.02 0.02 
Rural area 0.49 0.43 
Category   
1 star 0.01 0.01 
2 stars 0.09 0.07 
3 stars 0.47 0.46 
4 stars  0.24 0.24 
5 stars 0.04 0.07 
Swisslodge 0.11 0.11 
Other classification 0.04 0.05 
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Figure S2: Distribution of dependent variables (evaluation of applicants for cleaning and 
receptionist position) 
 
 
Figure S2: Distribution of dependent variables (evaluation of applicants for cleaning and receptionist position)
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3 Article #2: Access Bias
Compensation or Competition: Bias in Immigrants’
Access to Active Labour Market Measures
Auer, Daniel and Flavia Fossati
Under Review: Social Problems
Abstract
Participation in active labour market measures is often beneficial for unemployed individuals, particularly if their
employability is low. However, some measures can affect labour market outcomes, such as unemployment duration
or post-unemployment wages, even in a negative manner, because of factors such as human capital deprivation
or lock-in effects. Based on encompassing registry data that allows researchers to control for usually unobserved
employability variables, we find evidence of a systematic access bias whereby caseworkers in Switzerland assign
unemployed immigrants to activation measures based on what we call a competition logic that is mainly driven
by and conforms to an economic rationale and to the job centre’s performance evaluation. From the perspective
of the immigrants’ labour-market integration, this may be problematic because it results in an overrepresentation
of immigrants in measures with little efficacy rather than in the placement of immigrants in measures that could
compensate for (some of) their employability disadvantages. Conversely, we find that Swiss citizens are relatively
advantaged in being able to access more measures that promote human capital enhancement (compensation
logic) and that have been shown to be successful tools for labour-market reintegration. It is plausible that a
stronger reliance on the competition logic by caseworkers and the consequential overrepresentation of migrants in
low-efficacy measures amplifies the migrants’ general labour market disadvantages.
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3.1 Introduction
Welfare states insure individuals and help them to address different risks that arise during their
life. In modern work- and knowledge-based societies, an essential aspect of welfare state in-
tervention is the insurance against unemployment and the support for entering or re-entering
the labour market, particularly re-entering the labour market through participation in Active
Labour Market Programmes (ALMP). While labour market integration plays an important role
in the social and economic life of any individual, it has been shown to be of pivotal importance for
immigrants, as it accelerates their integration in a host society (e.g., Fleischmann and Dronkers,
2010). Moreover, immigrants are overrepresented among the unemployed and are thus more
likely to be confronted with placement in ALMPs. This circumstance will be intensified due to
the recent influx of migrants to ’Western’ labour markets. Hence, understanding the advantages
and disadvantages of labour market activation measures is essential.
Against this backdrop, more attention should be paid to whether these measures that should
ease labour market access are indeed assigned to and are effective for these particularly vulner-
able groups and are thus helping to mitigate social inequalities. Whether an equalisation of
chances through ALMPs actually occurs has been hotly debated (e.g., Hemerijk, 2014; Van
Vliet and Wang, 2015). More generally, Cantillon (2011) has shown that social policies may
carry unintended consequences. She suggests that policies designed to reduce poverty do not
always benefit those who - in absolute terms - are the most in need, and at times, these policies
serve those who constitute the more ’advantaged’ among the disadvantaged. This phenomenon
is known as the Matthew Effect (Merton, 1968, see also Grand, 1982; Bonoli and Liechti, 2015).
We contribute to this literature by inquiring whether the allocation of unemployed immi-
grants to different ALMPs is biased by the caseworkers’ anticipation of the difficulties that the
immigrants are likely to face when looking for employment. In fact, immigrants suffer from
’employability penalties’, that is, the reduction of their (true) employability, due to employers’
perceptions of social distance (for a similar argument regarding wages see Ebner and Helbling,
2016). Therefore, social distance perceptions capture the notion of a graded understanding of
an immigrant’s compatibility with a host society, driven by socio-cultural factors, such as shared
culture or language, religion, or history (see Hagendoorn and Hraba 1987; Hagendoorn, 1993
and 1995; Auer et al., 2018) as well as by the (perceived) distance of the educational and labour
market context of their country of origin. When assessing a jobseeker’s employability, counsellors
in public employment services are thus likely to anticipate that social-distance driven statisti-
cal and/or taste-based discrimination will be encountered particularly but not exclusively by
low-skilled immigrants in the labour market (for studies documenting discrimination for higher
skilled positions see Auer et al., 2018; Author, 2018a). Accordingly, we assume that a greater
perceived social distance translates into a greater exposure to scepticism about the immigrants’
labour market compatibility and ultimately to discrimination by employers. Consequently, im-
migrants are likely to be perceived as less employable, ceteris paribus.
While we do not contest the general importance of individual support services provided by
caseworkers, we argue that the anticipation of labour market discrimination combined with a
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strict evaluation culture of job centres creates strong incentives for caseworkers to follow what we
label a competition logic when assigning unemployed persons to ALMP measures. To optimise
their placement statistics, caseworkers have an incentive to focus on those unemployed who are
easiest to employ because the unemployed individuals are objectively or subjectively perceived
to be better adapted to the Swiss labour market context. Consequently, caseworkers may apply
creaming strategies to reduce costs for the job centres, increase placement success and eventu-
ally lower unemployment rates (McKinlay 1975; Muffels et al. 2002). Therefore, human-capital
intensive measures that aim at the upskilling of the unemployed are likely to be attributed to
those beneficiaries who are already closer to meeting the requirements of the labour market and
therefore have higher chances of being pushed into employment with the help of an activation
measure. While a placement strategy following incentives of a market-based competition logic
is rational from an institutional and possibly from a social perspective, it results in an over-
representation of immigrants with lower employability in ALMP measures with limited or no
human-capital component, which ’park’ participants in so-called occupational programmes. This
placement strategy is diametrically opposite to what we label the compensation logic, in which
the existing lacunas of skills of the least employable people are addressed by providing training
and other types of support to prevent a perpetuation of labour market disadvantages. In fact, a
placement strategy prioritising a swift unemployment exit and focusing on the strongest candi-
dates might lead to a situation in which the existing inequality is exacerbated over time instead
of mitigated because the unemployed are allocated to ALMP measures based on an economic
rationale rather than based on egalitarian thinking (to which policy makers have often claimed
to aspire; e.g., Cantillon, 2011; Esping-Andersen, 1990).
We analyse the occurrence of an access bias in upskilling and in the placement of the unem-
ployed in occupational ALMPs, based on Swiss administrative data from the State Secretary of
Economic Affairs for the entire population of newly unemployed individuals between 2010 and
2012. These data contain precise socio-economic information about the jobseekers as well as
details about the ALMP measures they followed. The advantage of our dataset is that beyond
providing extensive controls for individual human capital and other relevant characteristics, it
includes the caseworkers’ evaluations of a jobseeker’s employability (i.e., placeability). Notably,
the term placeability is able to capture otherwise hard to observe characteristics, such as atti-
tude, motivation, and appearance.
The paper proceeds as follows: in section 2, we lay out the institutional framework of dif-
ferent ALMP types, their performance and the general allocation regulations. In section 3, we
elaborate on the two competing assignment logics that caseworkers can follow (competition vs.
compensation). Section 4 expands the two assignment logics with the perspective of multicul-
tural societies. Section 5 describes the data, operationalisation and estimation strategy. The
results are presented in section 6, and section 7 concludes.
3.2 Classification of and assignment to ALMPs
Today, a plethora of different activation measures exist, and these measures can be classified in
different ways. Initially, the literature makes a broad distinction between Nordic human capi-
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tal and liberal incentive-based or sanctioning ALMPs (Barbier and Ludwig-Mayerhofer, 2004;
Daguerre, 2007; Torfing, 1999), closely resembling Esping-Andersen’s (1990) worlds of welfare
categories. More recently, Bonoli (2010) proposed a refined distinction of ALMPs along two
dimensions. Programmes may differ with respect to their human-capital component (upskilling)
as opposed to differing with respect to their pro-market employment orientation, that is, the
degree to which a measure creates alternatives to ’real’ jobs in the labour market.
The evaluation literature shows that these two activation strategies also differ with respect
to their effectiveness. Both meta-analytical as well as evaluation studies in Switzerland and
elsewhere reach the conclusion that temporary employment programmes (henceforth labelled
occupational programmes) are even detrimental to labour market success (e.g., Card et al.,
2010; Gerfin and Lechner, 2002; Kluve, 2010; Author 2017). These programmes aim at broad-
ening competencies and skills on a learning-by-doing basis as well as at maintaining a daily
routine. These measures are organised in the context of public administration, private compa-
nies or NGOs and consist mostly of basic activities, such as recycling clothes or packaging. As
a source of employment training for the common good, occupational programmes are designed
to avoid competition with private sector activities (e.g., Duell et al., 2010: 26). Tellingly, these
measures are also referred to as parking strategies (Considine, 2001; Finn, 2011; Van Berkel et
al., 2007). Gerfin and Lechner (2002) convincingly show that occupational measures system-
atically perform worse than do any other ALMP type, and the assignment of an individual to
occupational measures provides even worse results for improving an individual’s employability
than the non-assignment of an individual to an ALMP. Their explanation for this result is that in
occupational schemes, the human capital effect is too low to compensate for the lower job search
effort of participants. As an alternative explanation, Liechti et al. (2017) argue that ALMP
participation conveys a signal for prospective employers that varies across different measures.
They show that employers evaluate (fictitious) candidates as being substantially worse if they
participated in occupational programmes, ceteris paribus. This notion of occupational measures
being inefficient at best and partly even harmful for participants’ re-employment chances was
also conveyed to us during several interviews with caseworkers at local job centres, which we
conducted for this study and during informal talks with involved senior officials at the State
Secretary for Economic Affairs in Switzerland. As described by one interviewee:
“It [occupational programmes] is a programme which - true to its name - aims at occupying
time.” (see Table A.1 in the appendix)
Another interviewee elaborates: “If I have to put a person who is HR assistant in a tem-
porary employment [occupational] programme (. . . ) she will be answering the phone all day. It
will keep the person occupied. However, at the level of competence valorisation . . . [respondent
lifts shoulders].”
On the other end of the ALMP spectrum, human-capital intensive, that is, upskilling mea-
sures, aim to improve vocational qualifications through offering trainings on a range of topics
(computer literacy, language, business administration, etc.). These measures seem to have a
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moderately positive effect in the long run (Gerfin and Lechner, 2002; Strandh and Nordlund,
2008). Similarly, Butschek and Walter (2014) and Author (2017) find indications that public
employment programmes fare worse than do training programmes. Moreover, despite some dif-
ferences, the overall benefits (or detriments) of participation in different ALMPs are not tied to
migration background (e.g., Author, 2017; Nekby, 2008).
In summary, from evaluations and experimental studies and the assessment of PES counsellors,
we expect that occupational programmes are less likely than upskilling measures to compensate
for the jobseekers’ pre-existing disadvantages.
3.3 ALMP placement mechanisms: competition versus compensation logic
In Switzerland, entitlement to ALMPs is granted to all unemployed individuals fulfilling the re-
quirements for unemployment benefits (UB), which is defined as having a contribution record to
the unemployment insurance of at least one year during the previous two years. In other words,
ALMP eligibility is not affected by individual characteristics, such as age, gender, residence
permit or other factors. Upon becoming unemployed, jobseekers register with the Public Em-
ployment Service (PES) where they are assigned to a caseworker that monitors their job search
effort and - if necessary - assigns them to an ALMP to accelerate their labour market reinte-
gration. This allocation is based on the counsellors’ assessment of a jobseeker’s employability.6
The employability of a jobseeker is influenced by a set of more or less easily observable charac-
teristics. Most importantly, the counsellor must consider the human capital of the unemployed
individual in terms of qualifications, work experience, language competencies and other factors
and identify the weaknesses that could be addressed by ALMPs (e.g., insufficient qualifications,
obsolete skills, lacking practical experience). However, the PES staff also must take other factors
into account, such as soft skills (communication skills) and behavioural traits (e.g., reliability or
engagement). These unobservable traits are reflected in the routine classification that counsel-
lors make during the first visit to the job centre, whereby they assign the unemployed to three
categories of placeability : easy, middle and hard to place7 in the labour market (see interview 2,
citation 9). In cases in which the unemployed fail to comply with the PES counsellor’s ALMP
allocation decision, they face sanctions in the form of a suspension of unemployment benefits
of up to several weeks. In other words, the caseworker has high discretionary power regarding
ALMP assignment vis-a`-vis her clients (see interview 1, citation 5; interview 2, citation 10).
Consequently, competition-based allocation strategies aim at a swift and cost-efficient rein-
sertion of the unemployed, which is not only a direct response to society’s overall interest in
lowering the unemployment rate and in reducing social spending but also a response to organisa-
tional goals, such as decreasing the caseworkers’ workload. Moreover, the institutional pressure
to achieve swift placement is high in Switzerland, as the local job centres are closely monitored.
Each job centre is evaluated periodically by means of four indicators, which are assigned different
weights: (i) the reinsertion speed (weight 50%); (ii) the prevention of long-term unemployment
(weight 20%); (iii) benefit exhaustion (weight 20%); and (iv) repeated registration for benefits
(weight 10%; Duell et al., 2010: 17; 53ff.). These evaluations, which are made available to the
6In principle, the unemployed person can make suggestions to participate in a specific measure herself; however,
ALMP measures are usually suggested by PES personnel (Duell et al., 2010).
7We use this classification to account for selection on unobservables.
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job centres, create a form of direct competition between different sites because if a job centre
is marked as underperforming twice in a row, official admonishments are issued, and measures
are put in place. Overall, Duell et al. (2010: 54) argue that this kind of monitoring and eval-
uation system creates strong incentives for counsellors to optimise their placement rates and
to prioritise quick placements over durable ones and that “[. . . ] performance indicators have
probably an important influence on the activation strategy implemented by the cantonal and local
employment offices.”
Hence, from a rational choice perspective, the institutional constellation of monitoring mech-
anisms and evaluation criteria incentivises PES counsellors to systematically allocate the most
effective ALMPs to clients who are closest to the demands of prospective employers. Of course,
this focus on easy-to-place jobseekers with already higher employability is to the detriment of
individuals with difficult profiles and larger skill lacunas.8 In other words, a competition logic
results in a prioritisation of individuals who are closer to the requirements of employers for
participation in the labour market (Fraser, 1999; Nicaise et al., 1995). On the other hand, PES
counsellors are expected to provide long-lasting results for the unemployed individual. Such
durable solutions usually presuppose successful retraining and upskilling efforts, thereby allow-
ing the unemployed to interrupt precarious working biographies, which exacerbate the poverty
risk (e.g., Gallie et al., 2003; Strandh and Nordlund, 2008). The use of ALMPs as a way to
compensate for individual difficulties in terms of employability have been (and still are) the fun-
damental aspiration of this policy field. This goal dates back to labour market policies that were
developed in Sweden during the 1950s. According to its egalitarian ideological foundations, the
Swedish Social Democratic welfare system intervened by means of human capital-based ALMPs
to avoid the marginalisation of unemployed workers (Fraser, 1999; Nicaise et al., 1995). Follow-
ing this compensation logic, human capital orientated ALMPs aim to improve the match between
employment demand and supply by providing a form of skills compensation for individuals with
low or obsolete qualifications (Bonoli, 2013). By providing targeted training and support, the
activation policies that follow the compensation logic seek to prevent an accumulation of dis-
advantages that potentially lead to recurring sequences of unemployment and reduced social
mobility (Strandh and Nordlund, 2008: 360).
In summary, we argue that PES counsellors experience a trade-off between the most cost-
effective but possibly short-sighted strategy and the most egalitarian but possibly more long-term
oriented placement strategy. Following the competition logic, among all recipients, we expect
the likelihood of being assigned to a more efficacious ALMP measure to increase with a person’s
likelihood for initial employability, that is, her proximity to meeting the requirements of em-
ployers in the labour market, and with her derived benefit from a specific measure. Attempts
to achieve more egalitarian outcomes instead demand compensating for the individuals’ skill
lacunas and investing more in those individuals who are the farthest away from the labour mar-
ket. As we elaborate in the next section, this argument is particularly salient for immigrants.
In fact, they are generally perceived as being less employable because they are associated with
8An incentive for PES counsellors to assign individuals with low employability to (underperforming) ALMPs
may be due to ALMP participants not counting as unemployed in the official statistics (State Secretary of
Economic Affairs 2015).
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lower productivity (statistical discrimination, e.g., Baumle and Fossett, 2005) or disliked (taste
discrimination, e.g., Becker, 1957). According to the compensation logic, immigrants should
thus constitute the biggest recipient group of effective ALMPs.
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Figure 1: Competition vs. compensation
Figure 1 above illustrates the two competing assignment mechanisms. The competition logic
creates an incentive for PES counsellors to place unemployed individuals into ALMP measures
along the solid line. From a compensation perspective (dashed line Figure 1), this prevents less
employable individuals from catching up with individuals who possess higher levels of employa-
bility. In fact, the employability gap should widen if individuals with higher employability levels
have the possibility of increasing their skill sets, while less employable individuals are excluded
from upskilling measures.9
3.4 Social distance and labour market disadvantage
Many studies have shown that individuals with an immigration background10 encounter higher
hurdles to entering or re-entering the labour market than do so-called natives (Riach and Rich,
2002; Heath and Cheung, 2007; Heath et al., 2008; Zschirnt and Ruedin, 2016; Auer et al. 2017;
Author 2018b). The social psychology literature explains this disadvantage by showing that
individuals automatically classify people according to their in-group or out-group membership
(Fiske, 1998). Generally, interaction with in-group members is preferred. Shared characteris-
tics, such as a common cultural understanding - particularly related to norms and values - and
a common language (e.g., Hutnik, 1991; Reskin, 2000) ease the mutual understanding and help
to strengthen sentiments of support and belonging (Tajfel, 1982; Snellman and Ekehammar,
2005). Research also shows that individuals not only prefer interacting with in-group members
but also that individuals evaluate them more positively (Reskin, 2000). In the labour market,
and particularly in a hiring situation, this favours native candidates compared to candidates
with a foreign background.
9Note that these competing logics only apply to individuals who are generally deemed to benefit from ALMP
participation. The majority of the unemployed have relatively little difficulty re-entering the labour market and,
therefore, do not participate in activation measures.
10We define this term to include both foreign-born immigrants and Swiss-born individuals with a foreign na-
tionality.
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However, this dichotomous preference structure does not seem adequate in the context of
modern multi-ethnic societies. In fact, many studies find evidence for heterogeneous disadvan-
tage patterns among the immigrant population. In other words, some groups of immigrants
are perceived as being more socially distant from nationals than others. This differential per-
ception of distance generates so-called ethnic hierarchies (Hagendoorn, 1993 and 1995; Auer et
al. 2018). Thus, in the context of multi-ethnic societies, a more graduated approach to this
in-group favouritism applies. The expectation is that immigrants from a cultural background
that comes with a higher degree of social proximity integrate more easily in the society (Hagen-
doorn, 1995) and, thus, into the labour market11 (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001; Van Tubergen et
al., 2004). The concept of social distance is commonly defined as the perception or feeling of
“sympathetic understanding”, that is, a feeling of closeness between people and groups (Alba
and Nee, 1997; Bogardus, 1959; Ebner and Helbling, 2016; Van Tubergen et al., 2004: 709).
It is an inherently multidimensional concept that is informed by both objective and subjective
factors and is influenced by different mechanisms (cf. Portes and Rumbaut, 2001).
We argue that three mechanisms influence social distance perception in the labour market.
First, social distance perceptions can be based on physical appearance, a general perception of
cultural difference and perceptions of socio-economic distance, as immigrants often cluster in
groups with a lower socio-economic status. Although these different sources of social distance
perception inducing characteristics can be correlated, they need not be correlated.12
The literature shows that immigrants who stem from distant geographical regions, who are
easily identifiable due to facial traits and who are characterised by marked cultural differences
(e.g., wearing noticeable religious symbols, speaking a non-Western language, etc.) suffer from
increased levels of disadvantage (cf. Lindley, 2002; Weichselbaumer, 2016) that likely is due to
so-called taste-based discrimination (see Becker 1957). In Western societies, immigrants from
majority Muslim countries are particularly exposed to this form of discrimination (e.g., Di Sta-
sio et al. 2018). Switzerland is no exception; individuals of the Muslim faith have been in
the political spotlight. As the results of several popular votes suggest, a large share of Swiss
voters perceive this group of immigrants as being culturally threatening, both in terms of their
adherence to a non-Christian faith and with regard to their views on issues linked to liber-
alism, egalitarianism and particularly gender differences (cf. Dolezal et al., 2010; Ebner and
Helbling, 2016; Helbling, 2010, 2014). Accordingly, we expect that individuals coming from
Muslim-dominated countries are also more disadvantaged in the labour market (e.g., Constant
et al., 2009; Lindley, 2002; Van Tubergen et al., 2004; Di Stasio et al. 2018). Similarly, we
expect that individuals who speak languages that are (perceived as being) particularly dis-
tant from the host-country language(s) should suffer more disadvantages in a host country (e.g.,
West and Graham 2004; Koopmans 2016; for Switzerland see Auer 2018; Slotwinski et al. 2018).
11This is particularly applicable to immigrants from traditional sending countries, that is, those countries
in which the Swiss government actively recruited its guest workers starting from the 1950s. In terms of social
distance, these countries seemed to conform to the State Secretary for Migration’s policy of prioritizing immigrants
from the ‘inner immigration circle’, i.e., Italy, Portugal and Spain because of a shared cultural background (State
Secretary for Migration, 2015; see also D’Amato, 2010; Liebig et al., 2005).
12For this reason, we construct a general social distance indicator that summarizes different mechanisms in one
measure.
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Second, beyond the influence of these general social distance perceptions, there are character-
istics that are more closely related to labour market performance and thus should be particularly
salient to employers when hiring. The literature shows that when making recruitment decisions,
employers strive to find productive candidates by considering both individual- (e.g., grades, cer-
tificates, etc.) and group-based characteristics (e.g., gender, nationality/ethnicity, see Author
2018c). Several studies on statistical discrimination have shown that employers generally in-
terpret a foreign nationality as an indication of a lower level of productivity (cf. Baumle and
Fossett, 2005; Midtbøen, 2013). On the one hand, expectations of lower productivity can be
linked to the employers’ perception that foreign candidates have human capital of inferior qual-
ity (e.g., Damelang and Abraham, 2016). On the other hand, the employers could be likely to
expect that immigrants have lower levels of human capital endowment, for instance, because the
immigrants are more likely to have come from a disadvantaged socio-economic background (e.g.,
Arrow, 1973; Friedberg, 2000; Phelps, 1972; for an overview see Guryan and Charles, 2013).
Alternatively, human capital theory suggests that immigrants suffer from disadvantages when
coming from less developed countries, whereas immigrants from economically more developed
regions adapt with more ease to Western skill requirements and technology (Van Tubergen et
al., 2004, see also Ebner and Helbling, 2016). This is particularly true because similar economic
conditions presuppose similarly efficient educational systems and thus train their workforce in
a fashion that enables a smoother professional transition into Western labour markets (e.g.,
Friedberg, 2000). Again, actual differences in the quality of human capital provided by educa-
tion and labour market socialisation in specific countries of origin and the employers’ perception
of their differences are likely to be highly correlated. However, discrimination against foreign
workers can also be explained from a taste-based perspective (Becker, 1957) whereby immigrants
are disadvantaged because of individual dislikes or because employers anticipate problems re-
lated to either their current employees’ or their clients’ preferences for interacting with natives
(Andriessen et al., 2012).
Third, the ethnic threat hypothesis suggests that the size of an immigrant community in-
fluences the level of distance perception and thus the level of discrimination. Therefore, large
groups of immigrants are perceived as threatening the social and economic hegemony of the
natives, triggering fears of downward social mobility that lead to increased levels of prejudice
and closure towards out-groups (e.g., Blalock, 1967). The reverse effect should apply if we
lend credence to the contact hypothesis. The contact theory suggests that individuals who are
embedded in networks with a high prevalence of immigrants are more used to interacting with
non-natives and are, consequently, given the opportunity to form positive out-group stereotypes
owing to face-to-face interaction with immigrants (Allport, 1954). It is ultimately an empirical
question as to which of these explanations applies.
In summary, social distance perceptions are informed by general feelings of social and cultural
closeness (geographical proximity, appearance, language, religion, values, etc.), by the percep-
tion of a similar level and quality of human capital endowment (quality of education, similarity
of economic and technological development, etc.) and by the in- vs. out- group interaction
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frequency. In general, employers should prefer hiring individuals who are as close as possible
to natives in terms of these three groups of elements that inform social distance perceptions
(for a similar argument for wages see Ebner and Helbling, 2016). Put differently, labour market
discrimination translates into an employability penalty that increases with an individual’s per-
ceived social distance from the host society.
Hypotheses: We expect that to comply with their reinsertion targets, PES counsellors,
who are aware of employers’ preferences and perceptions, must assess the employability of job-
seekers and decide whether to allocate them according to the compensation or the competition
logic (see Figure 1). In Figure 2, we add an unemployed person’s origin to the equation. We
hypothesise that PES caseworkers when setting out a placement strategy for immigrants antici-
pate the objective or perceived origin-based employability penalty, including the anticipation of
employers’ discrimination, and assign ALMP accordingly. With a perception of increasing social
distance, ceteris paribus, employability decreases (because the penalty increases). Accordingly,
given equal human capital endowment, employability is lowest for the immigrants perceived as
being the most distant (black dots in Figure 2), increases with the perceived social proximity
of the immigrants to the host society (black diamonds) and is highest for natives (black triangles).
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Figure 2: Competition vs. compensation based on social distance
If PES counsellors follow a compensation logic, they should assign the unemployed with little
(perceived) employability to better performing activation measures (i.e., upskilling; black dot
crossing the dashed line). Conversely, if they follow a competition logic, they should assign the
unemployed with little (perceived) employability to occupational measures (black dot crossing the
solid line). We synthesise this theoretical expectation into two mutually exclusive hypotheses:
Competition hypothesis: The probability of participating in upskilling rather than in
occupational measures decreases with an individual’s perceived social distance from the host
society.
Compensation hypothesis: The probability of participating in upskilling rather than in
occupational measures increases with an individual’s perceived social distance from the host
society.
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3.5 Data and estimation strategy
To test these hypotheses, we rely on registry data provided by the State secretary of economic
affairs that cover all newly unemployed individuals in Switzerland from 2010 until 2012. The
data contain a battery of socio-economic variables, as well as information on the specific ALMP
measure(s) that were followed for the unemployed individuals. This allows the operationalisation
of the key criteria of employability and of ALMP participation with great precision. We base
our analysis on a sample of approximately 116,000 unemployed individuals. For a maximum of
24 months, we follow each individual until their transition into employment or their exit from
the unemployment registry. Two years after the registration with the PES, the observation is
censored. This usually corresponds with the loss of eligibility for unemployment benefits, which
in turn is the requirement to gain access to ALMP measures.13
Dependent variable: Swiss authorities define three main categories of activation measures
(i.e., occupational and upskilling measures14 and subsidies), which correspond to the following:
the theoretical classification by Bonoli (2010); the empirical study by Gerfin and Lechner (2002),
who rely on the same data source (previous years); and other ALMP evaluation studies (e.g.,
Butschek and Walter, 2014; Card et al., 2010; Kluve, 2010). Consequently, we define occupa-
tional measures as all temporary employment programmes in both the public and the private
sector. Upskilling measures are defined as courses and trainings that relate to professional devel-
opment (professional courses). These include IT and professional courses for different domains
(sales and commerce, technical jobs, hotel and gastronomy or social and health sector). Among
upskilling measures, we exclude those that are specifically targeted to certain groups, such as
language courses for migrants, which can be considered primarily integration support rather
than as professional upskilling. We define other measures as a control variable consisting of
ALMP measures that do not belong to either category of upskilling or occupational measures.
These include basic courses, such as application training, stages and measures supporting self-
employment, as well as courses that could not be allocated to a category (unknown). In the
evaluation literature, the effect of these different ALMPs on labour market outcomes is either
contested or unresearched.
Independent variables: To ensure that the results are not biased by a single (incomplete
or flawed) approximation of social distance, we base our analysis on seven indicators that mirror
the threefold theoretical distinction, as well as on an overall measure based on all seven equally
weighted proxies. Individual country association is based on citizenship as recorded by the reg-
istry. In combination with individual employability attributes, these proxies should capture the
most important determinants of objective and subjective social distance perceptions,15 ranging
from perceived social distance to labour market compatibility of the host and sending country and
the host-country population’s exposure to sending country nationals.
13Therefore, it is extremely unlikely that we would observe a person accessing an ALMP measure after two
years of unemployment.
14We exclude basic courses, such as CV checks from upskilling measures, as these do not increase the human
capital endowment of an unemployed person.
15Social distance perceptions may originate from both subjective and objective factors. This is why our opera-
tionalisation strategy captures a range of variables that may influence this perception, as suggested, for instance,
by Ebner and Helbling (2016).
70
First, we measure the geographical distance (capitals) between Switzerland and each indi-
vidual’s country of origin (provided by Gleditsch 2018) and the language distance between the
language of the canton where the jobseeker lives and his/her country of origin countries (based
on the Automated Similarity Judgment Program ASJP; Wichmann et al. 2018) as proxies for
a general social distance perception.16 Moreover, in Switzerland, as in many other Western
countries, Islam has been placed in the centre of public contestation. Accordingly, we introduce
the share of individuals with Muslim faith in the country of origin (based on United Nations
2016) as an additional indicator of cultural closeness (Helbling, 2010, 2014).
Second, we introduce three measures that should capture differences in terms of the coun-
tries’ human capital composition and regarding labour-market compatibility. The first indicator
we rely upon is the Human Development Index (United Nations, 2015). This index is associ-
ated with a variety of aspects that - objectively and subjectively - determine social distance
perceptions. For instance, the quality of education, exposure to modernisation and technologi-
cal developments, the means of production, or the labour market’s sectoral composition are all
determinants of an individual’s compatibility with the advanced Swiss labour market. Given
that Switzerland ranks among the three highest countries in terms of the Human Development
Index (HDI), it is safe to assume that higher HDI scores correlate with a better perceived con-
formity of a given country’s citizens with the Swiss society and its labour market. Henceforth,
we calculate distance HDI as one minus a country’s HDI score. Moreover, we introduce the
immigrant’s country of origin’s GDP per capita in 2012 US$ (World Bank 2016) and its share of
the adult population achieving a tertiary education certificate (Barro and Lee 2013) to capture
labour market compatibility and thus the expected ease of professional transition. Particularly,
tertiary schooling should not only have a positive influence on the outcomes of first-generation
immigrants but should also have a positive influence on the outcomes of the second-generation
immigrants, as it is expected to be a pattern that is inherited, at least in part, by the second gen-
eration. This dynamic is exemplified in several studies showing that the parents’ socio-economic
background explains a substantial part of students’ performance and, thus, affects the students’
later labour market outcomes (e.g., Levels and Dronkers, 2008; Fossati, 2011).
Third, to measure the mechanism proposed by the threat and contact theory, we capture
the size of each immigrant community residing in Switzerland (Federal Statistical Office 2016).
According to the theory, the larger the size of the immigrant community is, the higher the
possibility of developing feelings of competition and alienation. On the other hand, a larger im-
migrant community increases face-to-face interactions and thus decreases perceptions of social
distance (Allport, 1954 vs. Blalock, 1967; see also Laurence, 2014). To enhance comparability,
we perform unity-based normalisations for each indicator to range from 0 to 1. Eventually, we
create a simple composite measure of social distance based on the equally weighted mean of the
seven indicators.
16Switzerland consists of three main language regions (German, with a Romansh enclave; French; Italian).
These have relatively clear geographical dimensions that largely follow political borders at the cantonal level. We
measure language distance based on the dominant local language of the municipality an immigrant in residing in.
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Control variables: To fulfil the ceteris paribus condition of non-discrimination-based em-
ployability, we include a large battery of individual control variables in our estimation. These
comprehend the person’s quarter of the year of registration with the job centre, which takes
possible seasonal effects into account. We measure the standard socio-economic variables, such
as age, gender, marital status, years of schooling, and local Swiss language skills. In addition
to educational attainment, we capture whether a certificate for a professional education (e.g.,
apprenticeship) is available and whether it stems from a Swiss or a foreign institution. Fur-
thermore, we capture whether a person possesses a permanent residence permit in Switzerland.
Although permit status is not a criterion for ALMP eligibility, it can affect employability be-
cause more bureaucratic effort for hiring is required without permanent residency. In addition,
unemployed persons with a temporary residence permit may be seen as more likely to leave
the country, which would encourage PES counsellors not to place them in particularly effective
or prolonged, or even any, ALMP measures. The models also consider the person’s experience
(more or less than 3 years of work experience) and skill level, as well as the economic sector of
the person’s previous job and whether the person is now looking for a job in a different sector.17
In addition, we account for a person’s likelihood to participate in a measure ’by default’; that
is, the assignment of measures increases with a person’s unemployment duration. Especially
after around six months of an unsuccessful job search, the unemployed are usually assigned to
a measure to counteract the threat of long-term unemployment. Hence, we capture whether a
person has been unemployed for more than six months.18 Eventually, we control for the regional
unemployment rate (greater economic areas) at the time the unemployed registration occurred
since it is likely to affect job perspectives in general. Our modelling strategy builds on a simple
model of individual skills (i.e., employability) in order to determine an assignment to (specific)
activation measures:
yi = β1Si + β2Ai + β3Ti + i
where yi is the individual probability of ALMP participation for both Swiss and foreign
unemployed, Si represents a vector of observable skills affecting individual labour-market com-
patibility, and Ai is the caseworker’s assessment of a person’s placeability, that is, how easy
or difficult it is for the person to find employment from the caseworker’s perspective, taking
both observable as well as unobservable characteristics (e.g., punctuality, demeanour, etc.) into
account. Eventually, Ti is the binary indicator for unemployment durations of more than 6
months, to account for a higher likelihood of ALMP assignment based on longer job-search sta-
tus (rather than mere utility). Based on the theoretical argument, we expand this model by the
social distance proxy Di, which is measured by one of seven different characteristics associated
17It is important to note that ALMPs are not measures aimed at changing the professional orientation of the
unemployed but measures aimed at enhancing employability. Looking for a similar job in a different economic
sector, however, might render assignment to a supportive measure meaningful.
18Note that it is not clear whether individuals have a longer unemployment period because they lack employ-
ability, because they intentionally prolonged unemployment to participate in a measure, or because they were
impacted by the lock-in effects of ALMP participation. As a robustness check, we avoid this possibility of post-
treatment bias (c.f. Rosenbaum 1984) by performing the analysis without controlling for unemployment duration,
with similar results.
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with the unemployed individual’s country of origin (including Swiss), such that
yi = β1Si + β2Ai + β3Ti + β4Di + i
As mentioned, the efficacy of activation programmes depends largely on their human-capital
component. At the same time, no ALMP participation - which is true for the majority of un-
employed - can be interpreted as a signal of no necessity of upskilling and general support to be
pushed back into the labour market (see Liechti et al., 2017).
To account for the fact that participation in different ALMP types is not mutually exclusive,
we estimate yi separately for upskilling and occupational measures, using logistic regression of
participation and controlling for participation in other ALMPs. Note that the unemployed reg-
ularly participate in more than one ALMP. This is specifically the case for initial short-term
programmes, such as application trainings, which are subsequently followed by longer-term
upskilling or occupational measures. However, it is also possible to take part in both an occupa-
tional and an upskilling programme. Eventually, we introduce canton fixed effects to capture the
potential variation in job-centre quality (e.g., Duell et al., 2010), such as variation in the quality
and provision of very specific programmes in less populated cantons, and general labour-market
differences between regions in Switzerland. Moreover, cantons enjoy a high degree of flexibility
in terms of designing and implementing active labour market policies.
A usual drawback of registry data is the fact that potential additional determinants of assign-
ment decisions remain unobserved. For instance, demeanour, appearance or non-cognitive skills
are usually not observed but might influence a PES counsellor’s evaluation and the consequential
placement of an individual in an ALMP measure. Our data, however, include information on the
caseworkers’ subjective perception of a jobseeker’s employability that may capture a substantial
part of these unobservable characteristics. This variable reflects a direct assessment, ranging
from easy to hard to place, in other words, the employability assessment covers a person’s char-
acteristics that usually cannot be captured by administrative data. The availability of these
assessments, however, is limited. Overall, approximately 14% of the entire population of regis-
tered unemployed have complete covariate information in the registry. The summary statistics
in Table A2 in the appendix, however, show that the distribution of confounding factors is very
similar between the population of jobseekers and our sample with complete information.
In summary, we estimate individual ALMP participation probabilities and whether these
are affected by social-distance association, at the group level. In other words, given the ex-
ceptionally encompassing measure of individual labour-market compatibility, we would expect
no effect of social distance proxies whatsoever if caseworkers assign ALMPs by ignoring the
origin of immigrants. In contrast, if caseworkers assume a penalty for (perceived as more dis-
tant) immigrant jobseekers in terms of labour market chances, we would either expect them
to be overrepresented in upskilling measures (compensation) or overrepresented in occupational
measures (competition).
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3.6 Results
Figure 3 presents the odds of participation in upskilling and occupational measures with in-
creasing social distance perceptions. The corresponding regression results are shown in Table
A.3 (upskilling) and A.4 (occupational) in the appendix. The grey markers in Figure 3 show the
odds ratios of participating in occupational measures, and the black markers indicate upskilling
participation probabilities. After controlling for individual employability (objective labour mar-
ket compatibility and the caseworkers’ assessment of their employability), participation in less
beneficial occupational measures increases with the increase in all individual approximations of
social distance as well as with increases in the aggregate index. Therefore, the odds of partic-
ipation in less beneficial occupational measures are up to two times higher than the odds of
participating in human-capital intensive upskilling measures. In other words, individuals whose
country of origin is associated with a greater perceived distance from the Swiss society and its
labour market are substantially over-represented in low-quality ALMPs, even after controlling
for differences in employability. This is a clear indication of caseworkers being driven by com-
petition incentives. The fact that both participation probabilities - occupational and upskilling
- increase with perceived social distance is in line with our ranking assumption: individuals
closest to the labour market should not participate in any ALMP, and the efficacy of measures
decreases with increasing perceived distance from the Swiss labour market.
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Covariate adjustment for: participation in other measures, age, gender,
marital status, permanent residence permit, years of education,
local language proficiency, job experience, Swiss/foreign educ-credentials,
previous qualification, previous sector, quarter of registration,
jobsearch in same sector, caseworker assessment,
unemployment >6 months, regional unemployment rate.
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Figure 3: Marginal effects on participation in upskilling and occupational programmes, by social distance
measurement
The coefficients for background characteristics in Tables A.3 and A.4 show that people who
arguably face more difficulties in re-entering the labour market, independently of their origin,
have a higher propensity of participating in any activation measure. This intuitive result is re-
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flected, for instance, in the coefficients for age, educational attainment, and skill level. The fact
that individuals with lower objective employability are more likely to take part in any measure
but that - as shown in Figure 3 above - among those recipients, perceived social distance shifts
participation likelihood towards ineffective occupational measures, indicates that the caseworkers’
compensational approach is crowded-out by competition logic. At the same time, the coefficients
for the caseworkers’ employability assessments differ in direction, indicating that caseworkers
prefer to assign higher-quality upskilling measures to those unemployed who seem to face little
difficulties in re-entering the labour market, while occupational measures are reserved for the
hard-to-place people.
As a robustness check, we replaced social distance proxies with dummies for geographical
regions. These regions - European Union countries, non-EU Europe, non-EU OECD, Americas,
Asia, Africa - reflect a crude approximation of social distance perception to the Swiss society
as has been shown in both the Swiss regulations regarding its immigration regime (State Sec-
retary for Migration 2015) and in the scientific literature (e.g., Ruedin et al. 2015). Hence,
we estimate region-specific participation probabilities using the main logit model specification.
Subsequently, we calculate the average values on this regional level for each social distance proxy
and plotted them against the estimated coefficients for upskilling (dash linear fit in Figure 4) and
occupational measures (marker and solid linear fit). The location of regional-specific distance
perceptions as well as the estimated coefficients for ALMP participation (see corresponding
summary Table A.5 in the Appendix) provide a ranking of presumed distance perception that
is reflected in both the public as well as in related studies (e.g., Fibbi et al. 2006; Auer et al.
2018). Moreover, the absence of “outliers” and a stable positive regression line across all social
distance measures supports their robustness as a proxy of actual distance perception.
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Figure 4: Participation probabilities for geographical regions against the mean of social distance proxies
In summary, the results suggest that the net effect of caseworker assignment follows a compe-
tition logic in two ways: on a general level, individuals with higher employability among ALMP
recipients are less likely to be parked and more likely to be placed in upskilling programmes. On
a more detailed level, in terms of perceived social distance, assignment policies clearly favour
natives or those immigrants who are arguably more compatible with the Swiss labour market.
While the probability of participating in either of the two measures increases with a greater per-
ceived distance from the host society, the coefficients of participation in occupational measures
are more than two times higher than the coefficients of participation in upskilling measures.
Ceteris paribus, this translates into the prioritisation, in terms of access to better ALMPs, of
those individuals who are already closer to the labour market. Conversely, unemployed individ-
uals with low employability and larger perceived distance are overrepresented in occupational
measures and do not benefit from measures that would help them compensate for their skill
lacunas and that would thus enhance their labour-market opportunities.
3.7 Conclusion
Individuals with an immigration background face multiple challenges when trying to access the
labour market in a host society (e.g., Heath and Cheung, 2007; Fleischmann and Dronkers,
2010; Ballarino and Panichella, 2015). These individuals are oftentimes confronted with longer
unemployment spells (e.g., van Tubergen, 2006; Auer et al., 2017), the necessity of completing
more applications to be invited to an interview (Riach and Rich, 2002; Zschirnt and Ruedin,
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2016) or the experience of overt or hidden discrimination with respect to wages or promotions
(Blinder, 1973; Pierce, 2012).
In this study, we tested whether disadvantages also occur when accessing active labour mar-
ket measures, a field that derives its raison d’eˆtre from mitigating disadvantages by providing
upskilling and placement support for individuals experiencing labour market difficulties (e.g.,
Fraser, 1999; Nicaise et al., 1995). It is particularly important to inquire whether or not im-
migrants are more or less likely to be assigned to better-performing ALMPs because the vast
majority of activation measures are not tailored to specific groups of jobseekers. Instead, these
measures take an integrative approach and are open to all jobseekers (except for language or
alphabetisation courses which are developed specifically for immigrant jobseekers). Moreover,
despite some differences, the overall benefits (or detriments) of participation in different ALMPs
are not tied to specific groups (e.g., Nekby, 2008; Author 2017).
Based on the theory, we formulated two competing hypotheses about PES counsellors’ as-
signment strategy of unemployed persons into over-performing (training courses, upskilling) and
under-performing ALMPs (temporary employment programmes, i.e., occupational programmes).
Following a competition logic, individuals who are perceived as socially distant and therefore
less employable should be more likely to be assigned to underperforming ALMPs. Conversely,
if PES counsellors were to follow a compensation logic, they would assign the best performing
measures to the most disadvantaged individuals.
Our main results, which are robust to various specifications, indicate that PES counsellors
in Switzerland assign unemployed individuals based on a competition logic that is driven by
economic incentives and the job centres’ performance evaluation and is most likely based on
creaming strategies. Hence, PES counsellors seem to anticipate the employability penalty that
immigrants must face when entering the labour market. From a migration perspective, this
dynamic results in a systematic access bias such that more distant immigrants are more likely
to be parked in ALMP measures with little efficacy.
The competition logic amplifies the general labour market disadvantages that immigrants
face, which puts today’s role of ALMPs at odds with the ideological origins of the activation
model and its attempts to upskill particularly vulnerable groups. Consequently, one policy
recommendation includes the implementation of targeted (labour market) measures that focus
specifically on groups that are perceived to be socially distant from a host society to avoid
further disintegration (Ebner and Helbling, 2016).
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Appendix
Table A1: PES interviews 
  Interview 1 with two PES counsellors, Murten, Switzerland, 17.02.2016 
Control function  
 
 
Translation  
1 « Aber man sagt den Leuten einfach auch, dass das (Beschäftigungsprogramm) kommen kann, weil dadurch (…) 
der Eigenantrieb gefördert wird, weil manche sagen `oh Gott und bloss kein Beschäftigungsprogramm‘. » 
«One tells the jobseekers that they can be assigned to a temporary employment programme because this will 
incentivize them (to seek work) because they will say “oh my god please (do) not (assign me to) a temporary 
employment program”.» 
 2  « (…) ich muss die Vermittlungsfähigkeit prüfen. Dann ist es gezwungenermassen, dass ich die Person mit einer 
Beschäftigungsmassnahme konfrontiere. » 
«(…) I need to assess the placeability/employability of a jobseeker. It is necessary that I confront this person 
with a temporary employment programme. » 
Negative signal of 
occupational 
programmes 
3 « Wenn natürlich Schweizer, Herr Egger, Herr Müller, Herr Meier aus dem Beschäftigungsprogramm kommt, 
das ist und bleibt einfach schwierig. » 
«Of course, if a Swiss(citizen), i.e., a Mr. Egger, Mr. Müller or Mr. Meier, comes from a temporary employment 
programme, this is and will remain difficult.» 
 4 « [referring to immigrants in case they have no reference, they can give other than occupational programme] 
(…) Beschäftigungsprogramm als Referenz angeben und haben zumindest irgendwas, und insofern ist das bei 
der Gruppe, finde ich, wieder ein Vorteil. » 
« [referring to immigrants in case they have no reference, they can give other than participation in a temporary 
employment programme] (…) temporary employment programmes as a reference is better than nothing; for this 
group of people, I think it is an advantage. » 
Independence of 
ALMP assignment 
5 « Wir haben in diesem Sinne kein Gerüst (Standardablauf). » 
«We do not have a standard procedure. » 
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Table A1: PES interviews, continued 
   Interview 2 with two PES counsellors, Bulle, Switzerland, 27.11.2015 
Control function  1 « (…) C’est aussi quelque chose qui est important de voir [avec la participation programme d’occupation] si la 
personne joue le jeu, si elle est assidue, si elle va pas faire d’histoires, si elle se rend à son travail comme si elle 
devait se rendre à son travail “normal” j’ai envie de dire. » 
« With an occupational programme, it is important to see whether the person plays the game, if s/he is assiduous, 
if s/he does not make a fuss, and if s/he goes to the measures as if s/he went to a “normal” work, I would like to 
say. » 
 2 « [Reasons to assign an occupational programme] (…) peut être de différents types, la personne a besoin d’être 
encadré, placée dans une mesure entre guillemets pour travailler, parce qu’il y a nécessité d’acquérir une 
expérience ou ça peut être une mesure de contrôle. » 
« (reasons to assign a temporary employment programme) it can be because of different reasons: maybe because 
the person has to be managed, placed in a measure to work, because s/he needs to acquire an experience or 
because it is a control measure. » 
 3 « Alors ça [referring to occupational programme participation] a une fonction de formation professionnelle, 
acquisition d’expérience mais aussi une fonction de contrôle. Le but est pas le même pour les cours. » 
«Well [referring to temporary employment program], it can have a training function, i.e., a way to acquire 
experience but also a control function. The goal is different for the courses. » 
 4 « [referring to beneficiaries] (…) qui refusent (…) [participation programme d’occupation] et il y a toujours 
une raison: la personne travaille au noir, elle garde ses enfants... La personne qui refuse pour refuser 
simplement par ce qu’elle n’a pas trop envie, si on la pousse un peu en expliquant les raisons en général ça 
passe. Avant de mettre les pieds au murs, la personne va trouver une excuse en disant mais moi je ne peux pas 
faire ça, j’ai ça… » 
« (referring to beneficiaries » for those who refuse (…) (temporary employment programme participation) there 
is always an excuse: the person works on the block; s/he looks after his/her children…; and the person, who 
refuses just to refuse because s/he does not feel like going, and if we push him/her and explain our reasons, 
normally, they will take up the measure. When forced to act, the person will find an excuse and say, “I have to 
do this or this is the reason why.” » 
Low quality of 
occupational 
programmes 
5 « (…) le PET, il y a dix ans, était beaucoup plus intéressant et revalorisant pour l’assuré, et ça c’est vraiment 
très important. Aujourd’hui, je dois dire, c’est aussi une question de politique ne faut pas l’oublier, on est 
sémantiquement obligé, façon de parler, obligé de mettre les gens en mesure pour voir leur aptitude 
professionnelle. » 
« ten years ago, the temporary employment programmes were much more interesting and valorising, and this is 
very important. Today, I have to say, it is also a political question; we are obliged to put people in a measure to 
see whether they are placeable. » 
 6 « (…) là je dois mettre une personne en programme d’emploi qui est employé de commerce avec direction RH, 
ben le Coup de Pouce [name of a particular occupational programme] ça va être « répondre au téléphone toute 
la journée », on va l’occuper. Mais au niveau revalorisation des compétences … voilà [respondent lifts 
shoulders indicating that the benefit is low]. » 
« I have to put a person in a temporary employment programme, Coupt de Pouce, who is an HR assistant and 
will be answering the phone all day long; it will keep her/him occupied. However, at the level of competence 
valorisation … that is it [respondent lifts his shoulders indicating the benefit is low]. » 
 7 « (…) c’est des programmes [referring to occupational programme] comme le nom l’indique d’occupation, 
d’emploi temporaire mais d’occupation, et c’est vrai que le terme a été shooté mais ça veut bien dire ce que ça 
veut dire. » 
« It is the programme [referring to occupational measure] which - as the name indicates - aims at occupying the 
time; the name means what the word tells. » 
Non-adapted 
occupational measures  
8 « (…) au niveau des programmes [referring to occupational programme)], on n’a pas un panel qui est 
extrêmement large, donc on est obligé de mettre des personnes dans ces mesures qui sont pas forcément souvent 
parfaitement adapté. » 
« at the level of programmes, we do not have a lot of options; sometimes, we need to place a person in a measure, 
although the (occupational) measure is not ideally suited.». 
employability  9 « (…) c’est-à-dire quand la personne vient, on voit tout de suite si elle va être facilement plaçable ou pas. » 
« this is to say, when the person comes, we immediately see if s/he will be easy to place. » 
Independence of 
ALMP assignment  
10 « On a une marge de manœuvre mais à certaines conditions. Moi j’ai un Monsieur qui vient me demander un 
cours qui dure une année et demi, ça ne va pas être possible. J’ai un Monsieur qui vient avec une certification 
en informatique à 9’400.- pour une semaine, ça ne va pas non plus. » 
« We have leeway but within specific boundaries. I have a jobseeker who asks me to participate in a course that 
lasts one-and a half years; this is not possible. I have a jobseeker who asks to obtain an IT-qualification that costs 
9400.- Swiss francs for one week; that will not be possible either. » 
Budget restriction 11 « No. » 
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Table A.2: Summary statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Swiss 
in sample1 
Foreigners  
in sample1 
Total 
sample1 
Unemployed 
population2 
No ALMP participation 0.82 (0.39) 0.78 (0.41) 0.80 (0.40) 0.81 (0.39) 
Upskilling measures 0.11 (0.31) 0.14 (0.35) 0.12 (0.33) 0.12 (0.33) 
Occupational measures 0.10 (0.29) 0.11 (0.31) 0.10 (0.30) 0.09 (0.28) 
Other measures 0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.13) 0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.15) 
HDI level3 0.03 (0.00) 0.20 (0.15) 0.10 (0.13) 0.11 (0.15) 
Muslim faith (population share) 3 0.06 (0.00) 0.12 (0.27) 0.08 (0.18) 0.10 (0.20) 
GDP per capita (2012 USD) 3 0.44 (0.00) 0.84 (0.10) 0.61 (0.21) 0.62 (0.22) 
Language distance3 0.31 (0.43) 0.72 (0.26) 0.49 (0.42) 0.48 (0.42) 
Tertiary schooling (% adult pop.) 3 0.44 (0.00) 0.69 (0.17) 0.55 (0.17) 0.55 (0.17) 
Capital distance (km) 3 0.00 (0.00) 0.72 (0.09) 0.30 (0.36) 0.32 (0.36) 
Size of resident pop. in CH3 0.00 (0.00) 0.28 (0.10) 0.12 (0.15) 0.13 (0.16) 
Social distance index3 0.18 (0.06) 0.51 (0.11) 0.32 (0.18) 0.32 (0.19) 
Quarter of registration 2.65 (1.12) 2.71 (1.15) 2.67 (1.13) 2.58 (1.15) 
Age at registration 35.01 (12.71) 35.74 (10.71) 35.32 (11.92) 35.43 (12.04) 
Male 0.49 (0.50) 0.41 (0.49) 0.46 (0.50) 0.45 (0.50) 
Single 0.59 (0.49) 0.39 (0.49) 0.51 (0.50) 0.48 (0.50) 
Permanent residence permit 0.87 (0.33) 0.44 (0.50) 0.69 (0.46) 0.69 (0.46) 
Years of education 12.62 (2.62) 11.56 (3.16) 12.18 (2.91) 11.87 (2.78) 
No professional education 0.47 (0.50) 0.68 (0.47) 0.56 (0.50) 0.64 (0.48) 
Professional Swiss education 0.51 (0.50) 0.15 (0.36) 0.36 (0.48) 0.30 (0.46) 
Professional foreign education 0.02 (0.14) 0.17 (0.38) 0.08 (0.28) 0.06 (0.24) 
Local Swiss language skills 0.99 (0.11) 0.93 (0.26) 0.96 (0.19) 0.95 (0.23) 
>3 years work experience 0.58 (0.49) 0.57 (0.50) 0.58 (0.49) 0.55 (0.50) 
Unskilled 0.18 (0.38) 0.29 (0.45) 0.23 (0.42) 0.27 (0.44) 
Semi-skilled 0.18 (0.38) 0.30 (0.46) 0.23 (0.42) 0.20 (0.40) 
Skilled 0.64 (0.48) 0.41 (0.49) 0.54 (0.50) 0.53 (0.50) 
Job search in different sector 0.20 (0.40) 0.15 (0.35) 0.18 (0.38) 0.18 (0.39) 
Previous sector: agriculture 0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.14) 
Industry 0.11 (0.32) 0.12 (0.32) 0.11 (0.32) 0.12 (0.33) 
Technical and computing 0.07 (0.25) 0.06 (0.24) 0.06 (0.25) 0.06 (0.24) 
Construction 0.06 (0.25) 0.16 (0.36) 0.10 (0.30) 0.11 (0.31) 
Trade and transport 0.20 (0.40) 0.13 (0.34) 0.17 (0.38) 0.16 (0.37) 
Catering and tourism 0.13 (0.34) 0.28 (0.45) 0.19 (0.40) 0.19 (0.40) 
Bank and insurance 0.21 (0.40) 0.10 (0.30) 0.16 (0.37) 0.15 (0.36) 
Health and social 0.14 (0.34) 0.08 (0.27) 0.11 (0.32) 0.10 (0.30) 
Other 0.06 (0.24) 0.05 (0.23) 0.06 (0.23) 0.08 (0.27) 
Placeability hard 0.17 (0.38) 0.22 (0.41) 0.19 (0.39) 0.21 (0.41) 
Placeability medium 0.60 (0.49) 0.58 (0.49) 0.59 (0.49) 0.60 (0.49) 
Placeability easy 0.23 (0.42) 0.20 (0.40) 0.21 (0.41) 0.19 (0.39) 
Unemployed for >6 months 0.38 (0.49) 0.41 (0.49) 0.39 (0.49) 0.38 (0.49) 
Regional unemployment rate 4.64 (1.53) 4.86 (1.57) 4.73 (1.55) 4.47 (1.42) 
No. of jobseekers 67’685 48’935 116’620 840’625 
Note: Mean, SD in parentheses 
1 registered unemployed with complete covariate information;  
2 registered unemployed 2010-2012. 
3 Social distance proxies are unity-based normalised to range [0,1] 
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Table A.3: Odds ratios of participation in upskilling measures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 HDI2 Muslim3 GDP4 Language5 Schooling6 Distance7 Population8 Social D. 9 
Social distance proxy1 1.06* 0.92** 1.17*** 1.30*** 1.09 1.08 1.31*** 1.11 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.11) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) 
Quarter of registration 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age at registration 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 1.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Male 0.84*** 0.84*** 0.84*** 0.84*** 0.84*** 0.84*** 0.84*** 0.84*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Single 0.91*** 0.90*** 0.91*** 0.92*** 0.91*** 0.91*** 0.92*** 0.91*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Permanent permit 1.08*** 1.07*** 1.07*** 1.09*** 1.08*** 1.08*** 1.10*** 1.08*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Years of education 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 0.97*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
No professional educ. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
Professional Swiss 0.95* 0.95* 0.94* 0.95* 0.95* 0.95* 0.95 0.95* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Professional foreign 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.02 0.99 1.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Swiss language skills 1.19*** 1.16*** 1.18*** 1.19*** 1.19*** 1.18*** 1.20*** 1.19*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
>3 years experience 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Unskilled ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
Semi-skilled 1.09*** 1.09** 1.09*** 1.09*** 1.09*** 1.09** 1.09*** 1.09*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Skilled 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.01 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Different sector search 1.09*** 1.09*** 1.09*** 1.10*** 1.09*** 1.09*** 1.10*** 1.09*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Sector: agriculture ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
Industry 1.62*** 1.62*** 1.61*** 1.61*** 1.62*** 1.62*** 1.61*** 1.62*** 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Tech. and computing 1.35*** 1.35*** 1.35*** 1.35*** 1.35*** 1.35*** 1.35*** 1.35*** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Construction 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Trade and transport 1.39*** 1.39*** 1.38*** 1.39*** 1.39*** 1.39*** 1.38*** 1.39*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Catering and tourism 1.05 1.06 1.05 1.04 1.05 1.05 1.04 1.05 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Bank and insurance 1.45*** 1.45*** 1.44*** 1.45*** 1.45*** 1.45*** 1.45*** 1.45*** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Health and social 1.08 1.08 1.07 1.07 1.08 1.08 1.07 1.08 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Other 0.81** 0.82** 0.81** 0.81** 0.81** 0.81** 0.81** 0.81** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Placeability hard ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
Placeability medium 1.50*** 1.50*** 1.51*** 1.51*** 1.50*** 1.50*** 1.50*** 1.50*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Placeability easy 1.29*** 1.28*** 1.29*** 1.29*** 1.29*** 1.29*** 1.29*** 1.29*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Unemployed >6 m. 2.70*** 2.71*** 2.70*** 2.70*** 2.70*** 2.71*** 2.70*** 2.70*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Reg. unempl. rate 0.97** 0.97** 0.97** 0.97** 0.97** 0.97** 0.97** 0.97** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Other measure 1.87*** 1.87*** 1.87*** 1.86*** 1.87*** 1.87*** 1.87*** 1.87*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Observations 116’620 116’620 116’620 116’620 116’620 116’620 116’620 116’620 
Note: Mean; SE in parentheses; * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
1 Social distance proxies are unity-based normalised to range [0,1] 
2 HDI level; 3 Muslim faith (population share); 4 GDP per capita (2012 USD); 5 Language distance; 6 Tertiary schooling (% adult pop.); 7 
Geographical distance (capital, km); 8 Size of resident pop. in CH; 9 Social distance index 
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Table A.4: Odds ratios of participation in occupational measures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 HDI2 Muslim3 GDP4 Language5 Schooling6 Distance7 Population8 Social D. 9 
Social distance proxy1 1.39**** 1.20**** 1.35**** 2.45**** 1.97**** 2.15**** 1.91**** 2.13**** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.18) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
Quarter of registration 0.96**** 0.96**** 0.96**** 0.96**** 0.96**** 0.96**** 0.96**** 0.96**** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Age at registration 1.01**** 1.01**** 1.01**** 1.01**** 1.01**** 1.01**** 1.01**** 1.01**** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Male 0.92**** 0.91**** 0.92**** 0.92**** 0.92**** 0.92**** 0.92**** 0.93**** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Single 1.05** 1.03 1.03 1.07*** 1.07*** 1.05** 1.05** 1.07*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Permanent permit 1.09**** 1.01 1.00 1.06** 1.10**** 1.07*** 1.07*** 1.08**** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Years of education 0.99*** 0.99*** 0.98**** 0.99** 0.99** 0.99 0.99**** 0.99** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
No professional educ. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
Professional Swiss 1.11**** 1.07** 1.07** 1.08*** 1.11**** 1.09*** 1.10*** 1.10*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Professional foreign 0.83**** 0.88*** 0.88*** 0.88*** 0.84**** 0.87*** 0.84**** 0.85**** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Swiss language skills 0.98 0.96 0.95 0.99 1.00 0.97 0.98 1.00 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
>3 years experience 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Unskilled ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
Semi-skilled 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Skilled 0.75**** 0.75**** 0.74**** 0.76**** 0.76**** 0.76**** 0.75**** 0.76**** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Different sector search 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Sector: agriculture ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
Industry 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.98 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Tech. and computing 0.81*** 0.81*** 0.81*** 0.81*** 0.81*** 0.82** 0.81*** 0.81*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Construction 0.83*** 0.84** 0.85** 0.84** 0.82*** 0.83** 0.84** 0.83*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Trade and transport 0.88* 0.88* 0.87* 0.88* 0.88* 0.89 0.88* 0.88* 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Catering and tourism 1.02 1.04 1.05 1.03 1.02 1.03 1.03 1.02 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Bank and insurance 0.70**** 0.69**** 0.69**** 0.70**** 0.70**** 0.71**** 0.70**** 0.70**** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Health and social 0.78**** 0.78**** 0.78**** 0.77**** 0.78*** 0.79*** 0.78**** 0.78**** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Other 0.82** 0.81*** 0.82*** 0.81*** 0.81*** 0.82** 0.81*** 0.81*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Placeability hard ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
Placeability medium 1.02 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.02 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Placeability easy 0.76**** 0.76**** 0.77**** 0.78**** 0.77**** 0.76**** 0.77**** 0.77**** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Unemployed >6 m. 3.56**** 3.57**** 3.56**** 3.54**** 3.55**** 3.57**** 3.56**** 3.55**** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Reg. unempl. rate 0.94**** 0.94**** 0.94**** 0.94**** 0.94**** 0.94**** 0.94**** 0.94**** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Other measure 1.70**** 1.70**** 1.70**** 1.70**** 1.70**** 1.70**** 1.70**** 1.70**** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Observations 116’620 116’620 116’620 116’620 116’620 116’620 116’620 116’620 
Note: Mean; SE in parentheses; * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
1 Social distance proxies are unity-based normalised to range [0,1] 
2 HDI level; 3 Muslim faith (population share); 4 GDP per capita (2012 USD); 5 Language distance; 6 Tertiary schooling (% adult pop.); 7 
Geographical distance (capital, km); 8 Size of resident pop. in CH; 9 Social distance index 
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Table A.5: Region-specific participation probabilities and average social distance proxies 
  Swiss European Union 
non-EU 
OECD 
non-EU 
Europe Asia Americas Africa 
Upskilling measure1 ref. 1.05 0.93 0.87 0.99 1.38 1.46 (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) 
Occupational measure1 ref. 1.17 1.41 1.40 1.42 1.26 1.54 (0.03) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) 
HDI2 0.03 0.13 0.11 0.31 0.45 0.39 0.69 
Muslim3 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.17 0.45 0.00 0.41 
GDP4 0.44 0.78 0.72 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.98 
Language5 0.00 0.79 0.86 0.86 0.94 0.81 0.88 
Schooling6 0.44 0.52 0.37 0.51 0.74 0.75 0.93 
Distance7 0.00 0.70 0.89 0.73 0.9 0.92 0.85 
Population8 0.00 0.44 0.48 0.43 0.56 0.60 0.60 
Social Distance 9 0.13 0.48 0.51 0.57 0.71 0.63 0.76         
Note: 1 logit regression, 116'620 observations, region dummies. Unity-based normalized distance proxies: 2 HDI level; 3 Muslim faith 
(population share); 4 GDP per capita (2012 USD); 5 Language distance; 6 Tertiary schooling (% adult pop.); 7 Geographical distance 
(capital, km); 8 Size of resident pop. in CH; 9 Social distance index 
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4 Article #3: Language roulette
Language Roulette – The Effect of Random
Placement on Refugees’ Labour Market
Integration
Auer, Daniel
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 2017
Abstract
Placement of refugees and subsequent labour market integration within a host country represents a key challenge
for policy makers and has emerged as one of the most divisive topics in the public debate. Immigration policy in
Switzerland adopts random placement of asylum seekers across its different language regions. Hence, this policy
allows to estimate the causal effect of language skills on employment chances, as refugees are exogenously placed
across regions where the spoken language could either match or deviate from individual language skills. The results
of this “natural experiment” indicate substantially higher probabilities of finding employment when asylum seekers
are placed in regions with a lingua franca that matches their individual language skills. Additionally, the findings
suggest that language course participation can offset the reduced likelihood of employment in cases of a language
mismatch. While random placement of refugees may be desirable for political reasons, it is detrimental to the
economic integration process. Thereby, the study draws relevant conclusions for a larger European immigration
policy.
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4.1 Introduction
Immigration has been a politicised topic in European countries for decades, with an increas-
ing focus in the debates on civic integration (Van der Brug et al., 2015). In Switzerland, too,
a strong political right fuels resentments by warning against “over-foreignization” (Rian˜o and
Wastl-Walter, 2006), which led, for instance, to the acceptance of a public referendum against
mass immigration in 2014 (e.g., Gadient and Milani, 2015). The recent influx of refugees to Eu-
rope adds additional relevance to this debate. Rising numbers of arrivals are often used to stress
the allegedly increasing pressure on public budgets because asylum seekers fail to find employ-
ment, draw social assistance benefits and are therefore perceived as a burden for the host society.
However, these refugees - when trying to enter the host country’s labour market - face the
same challenges as immigrants who enter a country for reasons other than persecution and war.
Besides lacking language skills or a lower human capital endowment in general, they regularly
face discriminatory patterns (Colic-Peisker and Tilbury, 2007). Moreover, research has shown
that the physical and psychological consequences of war and the refugees’ escape journey have
devastating effects on a person’s condition, which in turn hampers successful integration (Turner
et al., 2003).
In this study, I argue that the manifold difficulties of entering the labour market are ampli-
fied when asylum seekers are assigned to their new homes through a mechanism that neglects
a possible match between individual and local language habits in different regions in Switzer-
land. While the shares of the overall inflow of refugees are calculated for each Swiss canton
based on its permanent resident population, the actual decision of an asylum seeker’s canton
placement is random. Furthermore, rigorous Swiss law prevents asylum seekers and temporarily
accepted persons from moving to other regions, oftentimes even after their asylum request has
been granted. This approach stands in opposition to many other European countries, which
usually allow refugees to move freely within the country.
To analyse the importance of relevant language skills, I make use of the fact that Switzerland
consists of different, sharply defined language regions: two large German- and French-speaking
regions, one in which Italian is the spoken language, and a smaller region in which Romansh
joins German and Italian as the official language. Consequently, a refugee who enters Switzer-
land and is “placed” by federal authorities might find herself in a region with a familiar spoken
language or in a region in which the local language is completely unfamiliar. Based on previous
studies analysing the effect of language skills on labour market outcomes, particularly on earn-
ings, I hypothesise that a language match or mismatch affects a person’s likelihood of successful
labour-market integration in terms of employment probability. The analysis of this “natural
experiment”, that is exogenous placement of asylum seekers into one region19, indicates a signif-
icantly higher probability of finding employment when the asylum seeker has proficiency in the
local language than when her language proficiency is mismatched. This positive language effect,
in economic terms, agrees with existing empirical findings (see Chiswick and Miller, 2014), while
19Similarly, Edin et al. (2003) use a Swedish immigration policy, where refugees are exogenously distributed
across locales to analyse the causal effect on labour market outcomes of living in enclaves.
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it is less prone to common issues of causal inference as described below. To improve the likeli-
hood of transition into employment for those asylum seekers who have been misplaced, I further
investigate the effect of language training provided by local jobcentres. The results indicate
strong positive participation effects. In that sense, language training not only benefits refugees
but also appears to offset the negative externalities that are derived from a random placement
mechanism.
Overall, this article aims to contribute to the general empirical evidence on language profi-
ciency and language training effects. Further, it seeks to provide general policy insights regarding
refugee placement, such as the larger-scale refugee placement mechanism at the European Union
level. While there are political reasons to support Switzerland’s random placement mechanism,
it obviously fails to consider a refugee’s compatibility with the local labour market.
The remainder of the text proceeds as follows. In the subsequent section, I present an
overview of the Swiss socio-linguistic context as well as the legal and practical foundations of
the Swiss refugee placement policy. Section 3 briefly discusses previous findings on the effects
of immigrants’ language proficiency on labour market outcomes. In section 4, I describe the
data and the identification strategy. Sections 5 and 6 present the results, which are eventually
discussed in section 7.
4.2 Background
In Switzerland, persons who ask for asylum are registered by federal authorities under the state
secretary for migration (SEM). After entering the country, asylum seekers are assigned to one
of the 26 cantons (states). The SEM allocates asylum seekers randomly to these cantons (State
Secretary for Migration, 2015). In practice, the SEM tries to ensure an equal distribution (rel-
ative to the overall cantonal share) of the largest sending nationalities, unaccompanied minors,
and medical cases (State Secretary for Migration, 2016). Hence, the decision of whether an asy-
lum seeker is placed in canton A or B is made randomly according to relative shares and without
considering either individual or cantonal demands. Once assigned, asylum seekers must reside
in the canton until they obtain a positive asylum decision and a residence permit as a refugee.
The same spatial restriction holds for temporarily accepted persons who have their asylum re-
quest rejected but cannot be returned to their country of origin. Hence, asylum seekers and
temporarily accepted persons are only free to move across Switzerland when the status of their
residence permit changes from asylum seeker to short-term (accepted refugee) or permanent
resident (see Schweizerische Flu¨chtlingshilfe, 2016). However, a spatial restriction very often
remains in effect even after refugee status has been officially granted. For instance, the right
to move freely across cantons is constrained when a refugee is dependent on social benefits (le-
gal ordinance AuG, Art. 62 and 63), which is the case for nearly all refugees lacking employment.
In short, once asylum seekers and temporarily accepted persons have been assigned to a can-
ton, Swiss law prevents them from moving to another canton or even searching for employment
outside their canton of residence (legal ordinance AsylV 1, Art. 22).20 Therefore, the exogenous
20Asylum seekers can file a complaint against placement in a specific canton if the unity of the family or the
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placement is immune to self-selection of asylum seekers into a specific canton.
The number of asylum seekers a canton receives depends on a weighting mechanism that
is determined by the size of the canton’s permanent resident population. The allocation of all
refugees entering within a given period ranges from 0.5% for the canton of Uri to 17% for the
canton of Zurich. These shares have been in effect since 2000 (legal ordinance AsylV 1, Art.
21). Within a specific canton, access to the labour market depends on cantonal regulation and
a person’s permit status. In general, if cantonal borders are not crossed, asylum seekers usu-
ally receive the right to work after a retention period of 3 months (legal ordinance AslyG, Art.
43). Generally, local jobcentres in each canton and federal authorities play an important role
in labour market integration. Regardless of unemployment benefits eligibility (legal act AVIG,
Art. 59d; Federal Office of Migration, 2007), the local jobcentre supports each jobseeker with
a platform for open positions. It also organises and funds training in the form of active labour
market policies (ALMPs), and caseworkers make use of their extensive networks with companies
in their region. Jobseekers, including asylum seekers21 (c.f. Lindenmeyer et al., 2008), thus have
a strong incentive to register at the local jobcentre. On average, more than 1,500 asylum seekers
and temporarily accepted persons register as jobseekers with the local jobcentre yearly, which is
approximately 25% of the group-specific labour force participation rate (c.f. Spadarotto et al.,
2014; State Secretary for Migration, 2016b).
Moreover, Switzerland can be clustered into different language regions, with German and
French as the two dominant spoken languages as well as an Italian speaking region and a Ro-
mansh language enclave, all with constitutionally equal footing (Grin, 1998; Federal Office of
Statistics, 2014). These regions largely follow political borders at the cantonal level, with some
bilingual rural areas and only a few bilingual cities, such as Fribourg/Freiburg. In the analysis,
I will focus on the 22 (out of 26) monolingual cantons (see map 1 in the appendix). At this
stage, it is helpful to briefly discuss the sociolinguistic context in Switzerland. As Grin (1998:
3) states: “Switzerland may be quadrilingual, but to most intents and purposes, each point of
its territory can be viewed as unilingual. Correspondingly, living in Switzerland means living
entirely in German [. . . ], in French or in Italian.” Relatedly, Grin and Sfreddo (1998) show that
Italian-speaking Swiss outside the Italian language region experience lower earnings, thereby
establishing their demolinguistic minority position in a socio-economic respect as well. In other
words, the language spoken by a Swiss person can be regarded as a determining element of
group-association that goes beyond language. This perception persists not least because can-
tons in Switzerland are the sovereign entities, causing an absence of federal-level language policy,
which also contrasts with other multi-linguistic states such as Canada (Grin, 1998). Eventually,
although English language skills are considered increasingly important, the situation in Switzer-
land can still be described as “linguistic particularism” (Demont-Heinrich, 2005). As presented
in map 1 in the appendix, Switzerland can consequently be clustered into three distinctive mono-
lingual regions whose boundaries follow political borders at the cantonal level, a bilingual region
individuals themselves would be threatened. A replacement requires the consent of both cantons involved (legal
ordinance AsylG, Art. 27 and AsylV, Art. 22).
21For the ease of the reader, I henceforth refer to asylum seekers and temporarily accepted persons only as
asylum seekers.
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centred in between, and the before-mentioned language enclave of Romansh located in the east
of the country.
Given the exogenous placement of asylum seekers into one specific canton by federal au-
thorities, placement into one of the language regions is by consequence random as well, that is,
independent of a person’s individual characteristics including language ability. At the same time,
as I will explain in the next section, several studies have found positive effects of immigrants’
language proficiency on labour market outcomes, such as employment or wages. Assessments
of such language effects often suffers from selection bias due to identification and measurement
issues. Additionally, existing literature usually focuses on a country’s general immigrant pop-
ulation. The labour market integration of refugees, although a pressing policy field, remains
widely understudied. Hence, I test the following hypothesis:
H1: The probability of successful labour market integration increases with an individual’s
ability to master the local language.
Consequently, a language match in the refugee placement process increases an asylum seeker’s
probability of entering employment. In a second step, I focus on asylum seekers without profi-
ciency in the regional Swiss language. Approximately 15% of these individuals participated in
corresponding language training. Evaluating this part of active labour market policy, I formulate
the following hypothesis:
H2: Participation in a language course increases an asylum seeker’s probability of entering
employment.
4.3 Previous findings on language effects
Several empirical studies have investigated the economic effect of immigrants’ language profi-
ciency on labour market outcomes, particularly on earnings and on the native-immigrant wage
gap. Usually, these studies depart from a broader concept of immigration. As I will argue
below, the focus on asylum seekers in Switzerland allows for a clearer identification of the lan-
guage effect because of the absence of confounding factors such as self-selection into a language
region or residence permits that are bound to (pre-)existing working contracts. Studies focus-
ing specifically on asylum seekers and refugees overlap with analyses focusing on the broader
category of immigrants in terms of providing evidence on the importance of language ability for
(labour market) integration. Often, these analyses are based on descriptive information (e.g.,
DeVoretz et al., 2004; Konle-Seidl and Bolits, 2016) and interviews with asylum seekers and
potential employers (e.g., Archer et al., 2005; Colic-Peisker and Tilbury, 2007; UNHCR, 2014).
Quantitative studies trying to establish a causal link between language proficiency and refugees’
labour market outcomes are still scarce (e.g. Bloch, 2007).
One of the key challenges of these studies is to account for possible estimation bias due to the
endogeneity of skills. For instance, higher wages might be achieved because of some other skill
that correlates with language proficiency (e.g., Bleakley and Chin, 2004; Chiswick and Miller,
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1995). Dustmann & van Soest (2002) stress that unobserved heterogeneity might overestimate
language effects, while they could be underestimated due to measurement errors in the language
proficiency evaluations, which are often self-assessed language skills or the language spoken at
home. For instance, Lindemann and Kogan (2013) find that language knowledge is essential for
immigrants’ labour market access in Estonia, especially for higher-status jobs. However, they
stress that their survey data captures self-reported language skills that could be biased and call
for “more objective measures of language skills – like independent language tests” (ibid: 121).
Aldashev et al. (2009), who rely on language usage in the household as a measure of language
proficiency, provide evidence for a substantial indirect language effect in Germany “at differ-
ent selection stages” (ibid: 338). Language proficiency increases the likelihood of employment
and the probability of working in a white-collar profession. However, after controlling for oc-
cupational characteristics, they find no evidence for a direct wage premium based on language
proficiency.
Moreover, selection into an occupation (Kossoudji, 1988) and the fact that language profi-
ciency depends on the country of origin (Espenshade and Fu, 1997) is likely to bias estimates.
Bleakley and Chin (2003) introduce the age at arrival in the United States as an instrument to
capture differences between immigrants from English-speaking and non-English speaking coun-
tries, which translates into language effects. They find a significant positive effect of English-
language skills on immigrants’ wages. A similar identification strategy has been adopted in a
recent study in the United Kingdom by Miranda and Zhu (2013). They provide empirical evi-
dence of the native-immigrant wage gap that is imposed by immigrants’ English deficiency using
the UK Household Longitudinal Survey. Therefore, Dustmann (1994) stresses the importance
of considering both spoken language and writing fluency when estimating language effects. In
his study using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, he finds a strong positive effect
of spoken language proficiency on earnings after controlling for writing fluency. In a general
overview of the “economics of language”, Chiswick (2008) and Chiswick and Miller (2014) draw
a relatively unambiguous picture of the positive effects of language proficiency on earnings of
between 5 and 30%.
In this context, the present study has several advantages. First and foremost, the setting
of random placement of asylum seekers by federal authorities is immune to self-selection of
asylum seekers into a specific language region. A common challenge for migration research
is the fact that individuals select themselves into migration and into a target country. Any
inference of immigrants’ characteristics on outcomes thus must consider that it is no coincidence
that this person is observed in that country or region. This is not the case regarding the random
placement into different regions within Switzerland. Second, the examined group of asylum
seekers faces major disadvantages on their path to successful labour market integration (e.g.,
Fuller and Martin, 2012). Consequently, the variation in both the types and skill levels of the
jobs that asylum seekers can find (or even look for in the first place) is very limited. In the
present sample, approximately 8 out of 10 asylum seekers were looking for employment in either
the agriculture, construction, or tourism sector. Hence, job heterogeneity might play only a
subordinate role in this analysis, as asylum seekers are mainly employed in low-skilled and low-
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paying jobs (c.f. Lindenmeyer et al., 2008; Spadarotto et al., 2014). Third, language proficiency
is not self-reported but assessed by the caseworker at the local jobcentre. When asylum seekers
first register at the jobcentre, they have a personal meeting (approximately 45 minutes to 1
hour) with a caseworker who, among other tasks, assesses the person’s skills, including that
person’s language proficiency in speech and writing.22 Therefore, any measurement error that
might occur is not correlated with the individual jobseeker (see section 4 below). Fourth, it
has been found that language proficiency and its effects on labour market outcomes are not
a linear function. Immigration to an alien-language country at childhood, for instance, allows
immigrants to acquire language skills before exposure to competition on the labour market. In
addition, language skills increase at a decreasing rate with residence duration (e.g., Chiswick
& Miller 2007). The fact that this study focuses on working-age asylum seekers and the fact
that their duration of residence is likely to have been relatively short allows the incidence of
language proficiency through schooling in the host country to be ruled out. It also rules out
estimates being biased by different previous work experiences that, in turn, could have induced
non-linear language effects. I provide more details on the identification strategy of this study in
the subsequent section.
4.4 Data and identification
The data stems from the unemployment registry provided by the Swiss State Secretary for Eco-
nomic Affairs (SECO). From 2000 to 2012, it covers all people who registered as unemployed
according to ILO definition, i.e., unemployed persons with and without the right to unemploy-
ment benefits who are actively seeking a job through the local jobcentre. Individuals are followed
until they exit the registry (into employment or as an exit from the labour force), censored at De-
cember 2014. Thus, if no exit from the registry occurs before that point, individual observation
periods last for at least two years, which corresponds to the usual maximum benefit duration as
well as the maximum monitoring obligation of the jobcentre for non-recipients.
From this entire population of registered jobseekers, I apply several steps of sample selection
to allow for a clean identification. First, I restricted the sample according to residence status and
retained only asylum seekers (with a request pending, including temporarily accepted persons)
aged 16 to 64 for women and 16 to 65 for men. Second, I constrained the sample to asylum
seekers without any rights to unemployment benefits. This step eliminates differences in labour
market outcomes that may occur due to some people having an earlier employment history in
Switzerland. Moreover, it functions as an indicator of recent immigration. Although theoreti-
cally possible, it is implausible that someone would enter Switzerland as an asylum seeker and
decide to register as a jobseeker only after years of residence primarily because labour market
integration represents one of the essential characteristics for family reunification and the possi-
bility of achieving a permanent residence permit in Switzerland. As a third step, I selected only
those asylum seekers who possess language skills that correspond to the three large language
regions in Switzerland, that is, those who speak German, French, or Italian. Research (e.g.,
Beenstock et al., 2001) has shown that the distance between languages varies. An asylum seeker
with an Italian language proficiency might face less difficulty in the German-speaking part of
22At least, this is the case for local/official Swiss languages.
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Switzerland than a person speaking a language completely different from any Swiss language.
Hence, restricting the mismatch sample to these three languages ensures greater homogeneity
among the groups. In turn, any finding of a language effect should be interpreted as a con-
servative estimate because regardless of linguistic distances, none of the three languages are
completely alien within Switzerland from a societal perspective. Ultimately, I excluded asylum
seekers that have proficiency in more than one of the Swiss languages. Additionally, observations
from four cantons that are defined as bi- or multilingual regions were excluded (Bern, Fribourg,
Graubu¨nden, and Valais; Federal Office of Statistics, 2016). Apart from these four exceptions,
language borders follow cantonal borders, which ensures that estimates are not biased by the
possibility of asylum seekers living in one language region and looking for work in another.23
I first test the existence of a language effect based on a narrow definition of language profi-
ciency that only considers the person’s mother tongue. This criterion is then relaxed to asylum
seekers who either possess their skills based on their mother tongue or on a non-native language
proficiency. I consider a person to be proficient in a particular language if the registry entry as-
cribes very good skills (best out of a 4-step classification) in both, reading and writing.24 Mother
tongue language is assessed identically, but reported separately. The assessment is done by the
assigned caseworker in the jobcentre for each individual during the counselling session. Typically,
jobseekers present language diplomas or other degrees to prove their skill level. This procedure
is particularly important for branches with a focus on communication, such as teaching. On
the other hand, especially for low-skilled positions or generally when diplomas are missing, it
is possible to assess work-relevant language skills orally (Regionale Arbeitsvermittlungszentren,
2017). Arguably, such an assessment is not free of measurement errors, especially if non-Swiss
languages are concerned. However, from a methodological perspective, the advantage is the
external assessment of language skills. For instance, Dustman and van Soest (2001) show that
individuals tend to over-report language abilities and that misclassification errors in self-assessed
language ability bias estimates. Finnie and Meng (2005) find that test score measures of liter-
acy perform considerably better than self-assessed language skills when analysing labour market
outcomes. Similarly, Edele et al. (2015) argue that subjective measures of language ability seem
to be inadequate estimates of skills as measured by competence tests. Their results also show
that self-reported language proficiency is biased across groups, for instance according to gender
or particular immigrant groups. In that sense, even if caseworker assessments of language profi-
ciency are likely to deviate qualitatively from a competence test, they would not correlate with
unobserved characteristics of the asylum seeker but at the caseworker level, as assignment to a
caseworker is exogenous. Based on this combination of caseworker-assessed language skills and
clear-cut language regions in Switzerland, I construct two different groups of asylum seekers and
temporarily accepted persons:
i. Match: Asylum seekers who are proficient in German, French or Italian (as a mother
tongue or non-native language) and who were placed in a corresponding language region.
ii. Mismatch: Individuals who do not speak the language of the assigned region.
23In the analyses, I control for family who have residence in Switzerland, which captures the possible deviation
from random assignment through family reunification.
24Applying different criteria of language skills (e.g., including both, very good and good as proficient) did not
affect the overall pattern of the results.
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Table 1.A presents the shares of asylum seekers with proficiency in one of the Swiss languages (as
defined above) among the population of asylum seekers registered as jobseekers during the entire
observation period 2000 to 2012. Approximately 16% possess some Swiss language skills, with
4% being placed in a bi- or multilinguistic canton. These individuals were excluded from the
analysis because, theoretically, they could have moved to a municipality within their assigned
canton where the spoken language matches their individual skills. Among the remaining sample
of 2765 asylum seekers, two thirds possess French language skills. This overrepresentation of
French is also reflected in an overview of the asylum seekers’ origins in table 1.B: among sending
countries with more than 100 observations in the sample, 4 out of 7 are African states, partly
with a strong francophone background. The overall share of African asylum seekers in the
sample amounts to 65%, followed by Balkan/former Yugoslavian states and the Near East. 
Table 1: summary statistics 
   
A: asylum seekers registered as jobseekers  B: country/region of origin of proficient sample1 
  N share   N sample share 
language proficiency    AGO 403 0.15 
 German 762 0.03  COD 385 0.14 
 French 1843 0.08  SOM 208 0.08 
 Italian 160 0.01  SRB 173 0.06 
proficient & multiling. canton 863 0.04  COG 165 0.06 
observations 22345   BIH 140 0.05 
     SCG 135 0.05 
     other Africa 610 0.22 
     other Near East 217 0.08 
     other Asia 166 0.06 
     other Balkan 119 0.04 
     rest of the world 44 0.02 
     observations 2765  
 
 C: covariates (at time of jobcentre registration) of proficient sample 
   mother tongue  language proficiency 
 [min;max]  match mismatch  match mismatch 
female  [0;1]  0.33 0.36  0.35 0.31 
age [16;64]  30.50 32.66  28.68 33.32 
years of education2 [7;21]  10.24 9.78  10.19 9.96 
   (2.50) (2.47)  (2.39) (2.52) 
family in CH [0;1]  0.31 0.34  0.28 0.39 
temporarily accepted3 [0;1]  0.65 0.68  0.65 0.64 
English proficiency4 [0;1]  0.03 0.04  0.05 0.07 
days in ALMP5 [0;68]  5.37 6.71  5.65 5.88 
   (10.26) (10.21)  (10.49) (9.77) 
year of registration [mdn.] [00;12]  2005 2005  2005 2005 
relative UE 6 [0.29;2.53]  1.44 1.02  1.35 1.25 
   (0.41) (0.25)  (0.44) (0.44) 
diff. UE7 [-0.01;0.08]  2.84 3.11  2.88 3.10 
   (1.30) (0.95)  (1.27) (0.99) 
language training8 [0;1]  0.11 0.17  0.10 0.12 
entry into job9 [0;1]  0.28 0.21  0.28 0.19 
observations   1035 346  2144 621 
SD in parentheses; 1countries with more than 100 observations: Angola, Dem. Rep. of the Congo, Somalia, 
Serbia, Republic of the Congo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro;  2 accepted degrees, based on 
the Swiss educational system; 3 residence permit F; 4 English reading and writing skills, equally assessed as Swiss 
languages; 5 number of days in active labour market measures during unemployment period; 6 cantonal 
unemployment rate at the month of registration relative to Swiss average; 7 percentage point difference between 
cantonal native and foreign unemployment rate at the month of registration; 8 language training corresponding 
to the cantonal language, provided by the jobcentre; 9 employment within 2 years of job search period. 
 
 
 
Based on the legislatively determined shares for each canton (c.f. legal ordinance AsylV 1,
Art. 21) one can pool all asylum seekers according to their Swiss language proficiency and cal-
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culate an expected probability of approximately 30% of being assigned to a monolingual canton
that matches the individual language abilities. Comparing the number of observations of the
matched and the mismatched group in table 1.C (both, mother tongue and relaxed language
proficiency) shows a matched share of above 70%. This indicates a non-random selection at the
second stage, that is, when asylum seekers register at the local jobcentre. In general, the chan-
nels through which asylum seekers register as jobseekers are not clearly defined and depend on
institutional (cantons, social assistance, NGOs, etc.) promotion and incentivisation to register
(c.f. Regionale Arbeitsvermittlungszentren, 2017; UNHCR, 2014: 27). However, there is only
limited variance between cantons in terms of how many individuals among the population of
asylum seekers register at the jobcentre. On average, around 10% of the cantonal population
register as jobseeker (see map 1 in the appendix). With regard to the language regions, the
shares range from 9 to 11%. Hence, it is safe to assume that language effects are not biased by
regional differences in the selection process into the registry.25
From an individual perspective, there are two plausible explanations for self-selection into
the jobseeker registry: first, the matched group might have a higher awareness of administrative
procedures, especially if the mismatched group lacks translation services, for instance by NGOs.
Second, it is plausible that asylum seekers who already possess the required language skills are
more optimistic about successfully finding employment, whereas individuals in an alien language
environment might postpone their job search until after a positive asylum decision or until they
have obtained some basic language skills. Further, fluency in the dominant language is often a
requirement to be considered for a job. Thus, asylum seekers with limited proficiency are likely
to be discouraged about looking for a job. On the other hand, this implies that the estimate
of a positive language proficiency effect is likely to be downward biased, since the mismatched
group would consist of asylum seekers who, on average, possess some unobserved skill that could
compensate for a lack of Swiss language ability.
To account for possible selection bias, Table 1.C further presents the variables used for the
covariate adjustment of the estimator. The first two columns show the summary statistics for
the matched and mismatched mother-tongue sample. Columns 3 and 4 refer to the sample with
a relaxed definition of Swiss language proficiency. I consider standard socioeconomic character-
istics that are likely to affect labour market outcomes, that is, gender, age, years of education (as
accredited by the Swiss authorities at the time of registration at the jobcentre),26 family status,
whether the person is an asylum seeker or temporarily accepted, English proficiency, and days in
a supporting measure (ALMP). Overall, asylum seekers in the unemployment registry are mostly
young males, having approximately 10 years of educational attainment, which corresponds to
elementary vocational training. The dummy variable for family status captures both, marriage
and whether a person has registered any dependants. This is also an important characteristic
because family reunification can affect the random placement process. However, as I will show
below, family has a negative but statistically insignificant effect on labour market integration.
25This assumption is also supported by members of the State Secretary for Economic Affairs (2017).
26For the year 2000, the data lacked information on educational attainment. In the models presented here, I
imputed years of education based on the remaining set of covariates. Alternatively, I dropped observations from
the year 2000 from the analysis with similar results.
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As a trend component, I include both, the year of registration and the unemployment rate of the
canton in which a refugee is placed at the month of registration with the jobcentre relative to the
national monthly unemployment rate. Thus, I consider the fact that asylum seekers are bound
to their canton of residence but labour market participants with other residence permits are not.
Hence, since the successful job searches of asylum seekers should be negatively correlated with
the number of competing jobseekers, it is important not only to have a measure of local labour
market competition but also to consider a canton’s possible deviation from the national trend,
which in turn might trigger labour migration within Switzerland. Further, I use the foreign-
native difference in cantonal unemployment rates at the month of registration as a proxy for
asylum seekers’ probability of labour market integration at the cantonal level. In the analysis, I
eventually introduce fixed effects of language region, which accounts for unobserved differences
in the labour market between regions as well as the general perception towards immigration.
Furthermore, the fact that the caseworker assesses language proficiency at the beginning of the
job search (thereby considering possible previous language training) together with the focus
on asylum seekers and temporarily accepted persons with no rights to unemployment benefits,
that is, without work experience, accounts for the influence of residence duration in Switzerland
(which is not captured in the data).
In terms of observable characteristics, the matched and mismatched groups for both samples
are relatively similar. However, the two matched samples (columns 1 and 3 in table 1.C) ex-
perience conspicuously higher rates of transition into employment than their respective control
samples who were placed in an alien language. Given that asylum seekers who register with
the jobcentre constitute a group that is likely to be more motivated or confident in finding
employment than those who do not register in the first place, an overall transition rate into em-
ployment of just above 20% among jobseekers within 2 years seems disillusioning. However, the
rate corresponds to a recent study by Spadarotto et al. (2014), who found that the employment
rate of accepted refugees does not reach 50% even after 10 years of residence in Switzerland.
Moreover, this figure can be considered as average compared to recent experiences in Europe
(Konle-Seidl and Bolits, 2016).
Estimations are performed using linear regressions with language region fixed effects on a
dummy variable Y that is assigned a value of 1 if a job until a given time t has been found or 0
if otherwise.
Yit = α+ βT +Xi + it
The treatment indicator T captures whether an asylum seeker was placed in a region with a
familiar or alien language compared to her individual proficiency, while vector X depicts the set
of covariates to control for possible bias of self-selection into the jobseeker registry. To identify
possible trends in the effects on employment Y, I estimated effects stepwise every 3 months up
to 2 years after registration at the local jobcentre. Hence, the results show 8 different effects
of transition into employment up to a given point in time. In addition, I estimated the within-
quarter effects, that is, the change in the probability of finding a job during a specific quarter
within 2 years.
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4.5 Language proficiency and transition into employment
This section shows whether a match between a refugee’s language proficiency and the language
spoken in the Swiss region into which that refugee is placed during the asylum process affects
transition into employment. Figure 1 presents the effect of a match between spoken language
in the region and individual language proficiency. Both the mother tongue sample (solid line)
and the relaxed skill definition (dashed line) are presented relative to the corresponding mis-
match sample (grey zero-line). The point estimates of the OLS regression of a language match
on employment status at a given time are positive and steadily increasing from a 3% higher
probability to enter employment within the first 3 months to a 14% higher entry probability
within 2 years for the language match and a striking 20% increase for a match with a person’s
mother tongue. The coefficients are statistically significant throughout, which is demonstrated
in the corresponding regression table 2, model A in the appendix. The results are also reflected
in the covariate-adjusted within-quarter effects (dot and x markers in figure 1), which estimate
the effect of a language match on the employment probability within a given quarter. In both
instances, a match with the mother tongue and a general language match, the coefficients are
positive and mostly statistically significant. The corresponding regression results can be found
in table 2, model B in the appendix. All models are estimated with language region fixed effects.
As indicated above, these results could be driven by region-specific factors instead of a language
match, especially because the sample is dominated by French-speaking refugees. For instance,
the results might be biased by a higher labour demand for low-skilled workers in the French-
speaking part of Switzerland, or it might simply reflect regional differences in openness towards
immigration. While such heterogeneity among Swiss language regions (and/or between groups
of asylum seekers) is plausible, it fails to explain the difference between language match and
mismatch, thereby further supporting the existence of positive language effects that are large in
magnitude and statistically highly significant.
From a policy perspective, it is important to emphasise the existence of a positive effect even
for non-native language skills. This should be considered as an encouraging signal for targeted
language training (see below). Assuming that mother tongue proficiency is preferred over non-
native language skills, it is plausible that the positive effect of a language match is greater for the
former. Further, the language effect of non-native proficiency might be overestimated because
language attainment could be associated with some characteristic (e.g. learning skills) that is
not captured with the employability variables in the regression. By contrast, self-selection into
the unemployment registry as a jobseeker (see above) could lead to an underestimation of the
true language proficiency effect. Asylum seekers who register at the local jobcentre might have
a higher average expectation of successful labour market integration, which is either induced by
the language effect or by a higher level of unobserved self-perceived employability and/or mo-
tivation. In this case, the mismatched sample consists of more motivated or highly employable
asylum seekers, while the matched sample includes individuals who rely (implicitly) on their
language proficiency. In other words, the language effect would be downward biased by lower
unobserved employability of the matched group.
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Figure 1: Effect of language match on transition into employment, covariate-adjusted
As can be seen in the full regression table 2 in the appendix, gender, age, family ties and
English language proficiency have no significant effect on employment probabilities. Education,
in contrast, turns out to be a strong driver of transition into employment. Further, temporarily
accepted persons have a slightly higher employment probability, which can be explained by their
longer duration of stay in Switzerland compared to persons who are in the asylum process. In-
terestingly, a larger difference in the unemployment rate between foreign and native inhabitants
is associated with a higher probability of transition into employment. One explanation could
be that higher immigrant unemployment rates are a result of higher immigrant labour force
participation, which in turn means that work-related contacts with immigrants are more com-
mon. This could result in less prejudice and increase the potential for the formation of labour
force-related networks (c.f. Bonoli and Turtschi, 2015), while it implies relatively lower native
unemployment rates and therefore less perceived threat (c.f. Pettigrew et al., 2010). Longer
participation duration in active labour market measures (ALMPs) decreases a person’s likeli-
hood of a successful job search. This could be because persons with an immigrant background
are more likely to participate in ALMPs with few or even negative effects on labour market out-
comes (so-called “parking measures”; c.f. Auer and Fossati, 2016; Gerfin and Lechner, 2002).
However, the ALMP coefficient decreases over time and eventually loses its significance, which
suggests the existence of lock-in effects in the earlier parts of the job search period.
4.6 On language training
Over the last decade, Swiss authorities have gradually intensified their efforts to provide language
training for immigrants (Lindenmeyer et al., 2008). The general provision of courses that should
facilitate the labour market (re-)integration of immigrants and disadvantaged natives is above
average in an international comparison (Duell et al., 2010). While there are several integration
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programmes specifically designed for refugees, including basic language training, jobcentres also
offer language courses as part of their ALMP. In the data at hand, only the latter are captured.
Access to language courses as an activation measure is in principle open for all registered job-
seekers. When registering at the local jobcentre, a caseworker assesses the possible benefits of
a supportive measure and assigns the unemployed person to a specific course or employment
programme.27 Consequently, the mismatch sample can be categorised according to participation
in a language training:
i. Asylum seekers who have German, French or Italian as a mother tongue and who were
placed in a corresponding language region (mother tongue, as above).
ii. Asylum seekers who possess German, French or Italian language skills and who were placed
in a corresponding language region (language match, as above).
iii. Asylum seekers possess German, French or Italian language skills, who were placed in
an alien language region and who participated in a corresponding language course (e.g.,
German in the German speaking region) provided by the jobcentre (mismatch, language
training).
iv. Asylum seekers who possess German, French or Italian language skills, who were placed in
an alien language region and who did not participate in a corresponding language course
(mismatch, no training).
Isphording and Otten (2014) have shown that the distance between two languages strongly
affects the attainment of a new language. Therefore, to retain the highest possible homogeneity
between the groups, I draw the language course participants only from the mismatched group,
that is, those asylum seekers who possess potentially fitting language skills but were placed in
an alien language region (see also Espenshade and Fu, 1997).28
27UNHCR conducted interviews with refugees stressing that they had to learn a new language due to placement
in an alien language region (UNHCR, 2014; see also Spadarotto et al., 2014).
28Performing estimations on an extended sample of all registered asylum seekers produces similar, yet potentially
biased results.
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Figure 2: Effect of language training on transition into employment, covariate-adjusted
The quarterly employment probabilities in figure 2 reveal an interesting picture (see the
corresponding regression table 2, model C, in the appendix). Compared to asylum seekers in an
alien language region and without participating in a corresponding language course (group iv,
grey dashed zero-line in figure 2), all other groups have a higher probability of entering employ-
ment in all periods. Interestingly, language course participants (iii, grey solid) show employment
probabilities that are almost as high as those of asylum seekers with a general language match
(ii, black dashed). Only the mother-tongue subsample (i, black solid) has a distinctively higher
probability of entering employment.
There are three main explanations for this result: First, it shows that language centres
seem to succeed in providing adequate training for their clients. This explanation is corrobo-
rated by recent research. For instance, Kaida (2013) finds that language training for recently
arrived immigrants in Canada increases the chances to exit poverty. Undoubtedly, employers
in most branches value language proficiency as an essential element of a candidate’s skills (for
Switzerland, c.f. Spadarotto et al., 2014). If language training provided by the jobcentres were
ineffective, trained asylum seekers would probably not be hired at a similar rate to matched
individuals. Second, asylum seekers who speak one of the Swiss official languages and learn a
second language during a training course might obtain some comparative advantage. Despite the
cantonal autonomy and regional differences within Switzerland, additional (potentially relevant)
language abilities are likely to be considered advantageous (c.f. Isphording, 2013 for the returns
to immigrants’ non-native language skills in Spain). Third, employers might value asylum seek-
ers’ language proficiency more highly if their skills are accredited by a Swiss institution. If
employers trust these institutions, their certification reduces uncertainty about the asylum seek-
ers’ actual language skills. In that sense, language course participation functions as a positive
signal for employers and therefore provides an advantage for participating asylum seekers over
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those who indicate language proficiency but fail to provide a corresponding certificate from a
Swiss institution. This explanation is further supported by the positive effect of language train-
ing on asylum seekers who are placed in a familiar language region and, partly, even on asylum
seekers with a matched mother tongue (not shown). While asylum seekers, particularly those
with non-native language proficiency, may substantively benefit from language course participa-
tion in terms of human capital, it seems that the signalling value of a host-country certificate
plays an important role when hiring under (aggravated) uncertainty about the candidates’ skills
(for an assessment of the signalling value of ALMPs, see Liechti et al., 2017).
In terms of active labour market policies, this result is encouraging. Independently of the
actual drivers of this effect, asylum seekers seem to benefit substantially from jobcentre language
training in terms of labour market access. Language course participation might be nearly as
helpful as “correct” placement of asylum seekers in terms of language skills. At this stage,
it is important to emphasise again that asylum seekers’ language skills are assessed by the
caseworker when the asylum seeker registers at the jobcentre and that individuals in the sample
are proficient in only one Swiss language. While some asylum seekers possess basic skills in one
of the three relevant languages, they are equally distributed across match or mismatch status.
Additionally, basic skills do not predict language course participation (not shown). Hence, the
estimates should not be biased by prior knowledge of a Swiss language. However, estimations
might be biased because language courses are assigned by the caseworker at the jobcentre.
Caseworkers have a specific understanding of the requirements of the local job market and are
also strongly incentivised to fulfil reinsertion targets (c.f. Auer and Fossati, 2016). Hence, the
results likely capture some selection bias induced by the intentional decision of the caseworker to
offer a language course to one asylum seeker and not to another. Put differently, it might be the
case that language course recipients possess some unobserved skill and/or that non-recipients
come with some trait that hampers labour market integration, resulting in an over-estimation
of the language-course effect.
4.7 Discussion
This study of an immigration policy in Switzerland where asylum seekers are randomly placed
across regions, has shown that language proficiency is essential capital in the labour market.
Being placed in a region with a familiar spoken language increases the probability of obtaining
a job within 2 years by 14% and even 20% for native speakers.
Therefore, this paper contributes to the general literature on the effects of immigrants’ lan-
guage proficiency on labour market outcomes (c.f. Chiswick and Miller, 2014). While such
studies often struggle with the endogeneity of language skills, the “natural-experimental” char-
acter of the Swiss authorities’ placement policy allows for clear identification, which renders
methodologically robust results. In addition, because language proficiency at the time of job-
seeking is assessed by the caseworkers, any measurement error does not covary with individual
characteristics of the asylum seekers, as is the usual case for self-assessed language skills.
From a labour market-oriented perspective, a strict random placement policy turns out to
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be detrimental for the integration of asylum seekers and temporarily accepted persons because
it excludes the possibility to match individual proficiency with local language habits. From a
policy perspective, there might be reasons in favour of such a random placement mechanism.
For instance, it prevents cantons (or states) with superior “bargaining power” in the political
sphere from influencing placement and taking preferred (e.g., higher educated or “culturally
more desirable”) asylum seekers. Random placement might also function as a prevention tool
against spatial segregation and increases diversity across all cantons (c.f. State Secretary for
Migration, 2016). Further, single cantons introduce new policies against immigration every now
and then, such as the prohibition of the Burka in Ticino (Grass, 2016).29 To avoid cantonal
boycott and to appease the public, a non-random placement mechanism will eventually have
to take such specificities into account, which would render a non-random placement policy a
political minefield and would potentially have a negative effect on vulnerable asylum seekers.
The same difficulties are likely to occur at the European level.
The second finding of this study, however, shows that language course participation sig-
nificantly increases an asylum seeker’s probability of entering the labour market. While this
set of results might be biased by unobserved skills and partly explained by a signalling effect
of participation rather than a clean language proficiency effect, this finding is encouraging for
participating asylum seekers and policy makers alike: random placement might be desirable for
political reasons, as it is the most transparent and unambiguous mechanism. In addition, even in
a diverse country such as Switzerland with four official languages, most arriving refugees do not
possess any host-country language skills. However, encompassing provision of language training
seems to be capable of compensating for misplacement and a lack of language proficiency.
It is important to stress that language depicts only one aspect within a larger array of poten-
tially disadvantaging factors, ranging from discrimination (e.g., Zschirnt and Ruedin, 2016) to
difficulties in accreditation of foreign degrees (e.g., Dietz et al., 2009). Further, the study focuses
on one specific labour market outcome, that is, transition into employment. This is motivated
by the fact that initial employment is considered to be crucial for subsequent integration. In
addition, the results are in line with both, qualitative (e.g., Archer et al., 2005; Colic-Peisker and
Tilbury, 2007) and quantitative (e.g., Lindemann and Kogan, 2013; Miranda and Zhu, 2013)
findings on other economic determinants of integration. However, Spadarotto et al. (2014),
for instance, find that incidences of job changes are relatively high for asylum seekers. Hence,
analysing other important determinants of asylum seekers’ labour market integration, such as
duration of employment, re-employment chances or contract types, would be a topic worthy of
further research. In addition, more detailed approaches towards language skills and language
similarities might turn out to be fruitful pathways for future research.
In sum, these findings provide strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that language
proficiency is beneficial for labour market integration. Further, given the substantial impact
of language training, this study makes an argument in favour of extensive offering of language
courses in order to offset the negative effect of random placement. The setting of Switzerland and
29In fact, the canton implemented a law against general coverage of the face for security reasons. Later, the
Swiss Federal Council voted in favour of adopting this policy on a national level (Tribelhorn, 2016).
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its distinct language regions undoubtedly constitutes a special case regarding immigration policy.
However, with a European refugee placement policy looming in the horizon, policy makers may
do well to learn from the multilingual Swiss laboratory. While the economic integration into the
European host societies depends on manifold aspects, refugees would benefit substantially from
a stronger focus on adequate language training or, if applicable, from a placement that takes
pre-existing language skills into account.
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Appendix
 
Map 1: Language regions and share of registered jobseekers among cantonal population of asylum seekers
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Table 2: effect of language proficiency on transition into employment 
  
Model A: cumulative effects1 
 3 m 6 m 9 m 12 m 15 m 18 m 21 m 24 m 
matched mother tongue 0.03** 0.07*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.20*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
female 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
age 0.02 0.08 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 0.02 0.02 0.07 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
years of education 0.09** 0.15** 0.22*** 0.19** 0.28*** 0.27*** 0.29*** 0.26*** 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
family in CH -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
temporarily accepted -0.00 0.03 0.04** 0.03* 0.03 0.04* 0.05** 0.04 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
English proficiency 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
days in ALMP -0.11*** -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.22*** -0.18*** -0.16** -0.08 -0.07 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
year of registration 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
relative UE -0.04 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.09 0.14 0.14 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) 
diff. UE 0.00 0.01** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
observations 1381 1381 1381 1381 1381 1381 1381 1381 
         
language match 0.03*** 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
observations 2765 2765 2765 2765 2765 2765 2765 2765 
         
Model B: within-quarter effects1 
 qtr 1 qtr 2 qtr 3 qtr 4 qtr 5 qtr 6 qtr 7 qtr 8 
matched mother tongue 0.03** 0.04** 0.02 0.02 0.02* 0.02* 0.03*** 0.02** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
observations 1381 1381 1381 1381 1381 1381 1381 1381 
language match 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.02* 0.01 0.01 0.01* 0.01* 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
observations 2765 2765 2765 2765 2765 2765 2765 2765 
         
Model C: cumulative effects, reference: mismatch, no language training1 
 3 m 6 m 9 m 12 m 15 m 18 m 21 m 24 m 
mismatch, training -0.00 0.05 0.07* 0.10** 0.09* 0.11** 0.12** 0.12** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
language match 0.02* 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
mother tongue 0.03*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
observations 2536 2536 2536 2536 2536 2536 2536 2536 
1coefficients are covariate adjusted with language region FE; SE in parentheses; *p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 
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